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Regulating the U.S. Treasury Market

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The market for U.S. Treasury securities is critical to our monetary policy and government funding. It also serves as a benchmark for pricing other investments and has provided a haven for investors seeking safety and stability. However, concern has recently arisen that “primary dealers” in that market might have manipulated prices. In addition, an unusual market volatility event that occurred in October 2014, and the growth of high-frequency trading have raised further questions over the adequacy of regulation in that market. This article addresses those concerns. It first describes the U.S. Treasury market and identifies efforts by traders over the years to manipulate prices. It will describe the existing regulatory structure, which allocates jurisdiction to multiple regulators that have overlapping missions. The article then advocates the creation of a more streamlined and efficient regulatory system that would be administered by a single business conduct regulator tasked with monitoring and policing abuses in this critical market.
I. INTRODUCTION

“The U.S. Treasury market is the deepest and most liquid government securities market in the world.” It plays a critical role in funding the government and acts as an important tool in implementing the Federal Reserve Board’s (Fed) monetary policies. The U.S. Treasury market also serves as a benchmark for pricing other securities, it provides a safe haven for investors seeking stability and safety, and it acts as a source of liquidity for the short-term working capital needs of many large businesses.

The Treasury market also provides speculative opportunities when interest rates fluctuate or market uncertainty accelerates. Accompanying this speculative trading have been several scandals involving traders who tried to manipulate Treasury security prices. As will be described below, the first of those scandals occurred with the inception of U.S. government bond issues in the 1790s. More recently, in 2015, several large financial institutions that act as “primary dealers” in the Treasury market became the targets of governmental investigations seeking to determine whether they manipulated that market.

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2. Id.

3. As further described by one author:

There are about $12.5 trillion in marketable securities outstanding, and primary dealers trade an average of around $500 billion every day with their clients and with other parties. Treasury securities play a variety of roles in the U.S. economy. They are, of course, the federal government’s primary vehicle for financing the federal deficit and refinancing maturing debt. Global investors use Treasuries for investing and hedging purposes, and as benchmarks for pricing other types of assets. In addition, many in the public and private sectors use Treasury yields to glean information about expectations for the future course of the U.S. and global economy.


4. See id.


6. Primary dealers are designated as such by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. That designation allows those dealers to participate broadly in Treasury auctions and to distribute Treasury securities to other market participants. Primary dealers include large banks and broker-dealers. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Primary Dealers, http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/primarydealers.html [https://perma.cc/DKU2-STLR] (last visited Nov. 21, 2016).

7. Alexandra Scaggs, Daniel Kruger & Keri Geiger, Primary-Dealer Trader Talk is Open Secret
Concerns over speculative abuses in the U.S. treasury market had been height-
ened earlier after unusual volatility occurred in that market on October 15, 2014. The growing presence of high-frequency traders (HFTs) and concerns over their trading practices are raising additional doubts over the adequacy of the multi-tiered regulatory structure that now exists for the Treasury market.

This article will describe the development and operation of the U.S. Treasury market and will address historical concerns over speculation and manipulation of prices of those instruments. It will then describe the present structure of the U.S. Treasury market and the allocation of jurisdiction of its operations among a host of regulators, including the Department of the Treasury (Treasury), the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Fed), the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (New York Fed), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). The article will describe prior manipulations of the Treasury market, the events that occurred in the U.S. Treasury market on October 15, 2014, and recent concerns with possible price manipulations. The article will then advocate a reformation of the current regulatory structure that would combine business conduct regulation into a single

8. See DEP’T OF THE TREAS. J. REP. 1, supra note 1.

[https://perma.cc/JV8C-7L2Y] (describing concerns with such trading).
II. DEVELOPMENT AND STRUCTURE OF THE TREASURY MARKET

A. Development of the U.S. Treasury Market

Government bonds and other sovereign borrowings were in common use long before the U.S. obtained its independence. The American colonies had issued bills of credit to fund their operations, but such debt issuance was sharply curtailed by the English authorities long before the Revolution. Still, a valuable lesson was learned, and the Continental Congress and individual colonies funded the Revolution through the issuance of varying forms of debt securities. Those issues included the so-called Continental dollar that was used by the Congress to finance the Continental Army until those instruments became virtually worthless as the result of over-issuance and a lack of funding for their redemption.

The present U.S. Treasury market was founded on that Revolutionary War debt. After the conclusion of that conflict, Alexander Hamilton convinced Congress to assume the Revolutionary War debts of the Continental Congress and the colonies. That assumption would create a national debt, which Hamilton thought would be a “national blessing” in the funding of government operations, as long as it was “not excessive” in amount.

Hamilton’s assumption effort was not without controversy, but a not altogether seemly bargain with its principal opponent, Thomas Jefferson, assured...
its passage. Jefferson agreed to withdraw his opposition to Hamilton’s assumption program in exchange for Hamilton’s support in enacting legislation to move the new nation’s capital to Washington, D.C.

Scandal soon followed after it was discovered that members of Congress, and their merchant friends, on being informed of this bargain, began purchasing the old debt from its unsuspecting owners at steep discounts. They then tendered the debt for face value when the assumption measure was enacted. Such activity was not illegal at the time. However, it occasioned much outrage on the part of Thomas Jefferson who sharply criticized this “base scramble” for profits at the expense of the uninformed.

Speculation in the U.S. government debt securities that were issued in exchange for the Revolutionary War debt was immediate. One speculator, William Duer, who had served as Assistant Secretary of the Treasury under Alexander Hamilton, formed a syndicate called the “Six Percent Club” for the purpose of cornering U.S. government securities that were then paying an interest rate of six percent. Such cornering operations seek complete control of a security or commodity so that the perpetrator can dictate prices to other investors. That effort failed, however, ruining Duer and sending him to debtor’s prison, where he died, causing a national panic in the process.

20. Id. at 107–08.
21. MARKHAM, supra note 12, at 80.
22. Id.
23. At the time there was no legal prohibition against such activity by members of Congress. MARKHAM, supra note 12, 80–81. More than 200 years after that event Congress passed the STOCK Act in 2012, which now prohibits such insider trading by members of Congress and their staff. Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act of 2012 (STOCK Act), Pub. L. No. 112-105, 126 Stat. 291.
24. Jefferson charged that:

When the trial of strength had indicated the form in which the bill would finally pass, this being known within doors sooner than without...the base scramble began. Couriers and relay horses by land, and swift-sailing boats by sea, were flying in all directions. Active partners and agents were associated and employed in every state, town and country neighborhood; and this paper was bought for five shillings, and even as low as two shillings, in the pound, before the holder knew that congress had already provided for its redemption at par. Immense sums were thus filched from the poor and ignorant, and fortunes accumulated by those who had themselves been poor enough before.

ROBERT IRVING WARSHOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON FIRST AMERICAN BUSINESSMAN 123–24 (1931).
26. Id.
27. See generally MARKHAM, supra note 5, at 40–41 (describing cornering operations).
28. See MARKHAM, supra note 12, at 108–11 (describing those events). That debacle occasioned
Despite such abuses, the U.S. treasury market grew and became an important funding source for the government.\(^2\) That role became critical during the Civil War, during which the Northern government issued nearly $3 billion in bonds.\(^3\) U.S. government bonds once again proved their value during World War I when Liberty bonds were sold to the public and raised $18 billion to fund that conflict.\(^4\) An additional $150 billion was raised through various bond offerings to fund World War II.\(^5\)

In recent times, the U.S. government bond market does much more than fund war operations.\(^6\) Among other things, it is used to fund the seemingly ever-growing national debt, which increased from $5.6 trillion in 2000 to nearly $15 trillion in 2014.\(^7\)

more criticism from Thomas Jefferson:

\[A\]t length our paper bubble is burst, the failure of Duer in New York soon brought on others, and these still more, like nine pins knocking one another down, till at that place the bankruptcy is become general, every man concerned in paper being broke, and most of the tradesman and farmers, who lend it to them at an interest from 3. to 6. per cent a month, have lost the whole.

WARSHOW, supra note 24, at 150.

29. MARKHAM, supra note 12, at 114.

30. Many of those bonds were sold to the public through the efforts of Jay Cooke, a financier who would fail spectacularly after the war and cause the Panic of 1873. See MARKHAM, supra note 12, at 211–13, 220, 291–93 (describing Cooke’s bond sales campaigns and the failure of his firm in 1873).


32. Id. at 263.

33. Id. at 266.


One leading credit agency, Standard & Poor’s downgraded U.S. debt below an AAA rating in 2011. Zachary A. Goldfarb, S&P Downgrades U.S. Credit Rating for First Time, WASH. POST (Aug. 6, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/sandp-considering-first-downgrade-of-us-credit-rating/2011/08/05/gIQAqKeIXl_story.html [https://perma.cc/CXU2-QVKJ]. The growth of the federal deficit has raised political concerns over whether the government will at some point bankrupt itself unless spending is curbed. For example, in one debate between President Barack Obama and former Governor Mitt Romney, the latter charged that the President had vastly increased the national debt during his first term:

We've gone from $10 trillion of national debt, to $16 trillion of national debt. If the president were reelected, we'd go to almost $20 trillion of national debt. This puts us on a road to Greece.

B. Government Debt Instruments

The modern Treasury market is composed of a number of instruments. Treasury bills (T-Bills) are short-term debt obligations that "are sold in terms ranging from a few days to 52 weeks. Bills are typically sold at a discount from the par amount (also called face value)." Treasury notes, sometimes called T-Notes, earn a fixed rate of interest every six months until maturity. Notes are issued in terms of 2, 3, 5, 7, and 10 years. Treasury bonds operate in the manner as T-Notes except the Treasury bond has a maturity date of thirty years from its issuance.

The Treasury Department also issues other forms of debt instruments including "floating rate notes" (FRNs) that are "[i]ssued for a term of two years, and pay varying amounts of interest quarterly until maturity." Interest payments rise and fall based on discount rates in auctions of 13-week Treasury bills. Another form of Treasury borrowing is the Treasury Inflation Protected Security (TIPS) that provides protection from the effects of inflation.
"The principal of a TIPS increases with inflation and decreases with deflation, as measured by the Consumer Price Index. When a TIPS matures, you are paid the adjusted principal or original principal, whichever is greater."  

C. Treasury Auctions  

"Treasury uses an auction process to sell marketable securities and determine their rate, yield, or discount margin." This process begins with an announcement by the Treasury Department that it will hold auction for a planned issuance of a particular instrument. This announcement will specify the amount to be issued and the maturity date of the instrument. Bids in these auctions may be "competitive" or "noncompetitive." In a competitive bid, the bidder specifies the rate, yield or discount rate that the bidder will accept. In a noncompetitive bid, the bidder agrees to accept the rate, yield or discount set at the auction.  

The Treasury Department conducts a "Dutch Auction" that sets the rate, yield or spread. It has described this process as follows: At the close of an auction, Treasury accepts all noncompetitive bids that comply with the auction rules, and then accepts competitive bids in ascending order in terms of their rates, yields, 

42. "TIPS pay interest twice a year, at a fixed rate. The rate is applied to the adjusted principal; so, like the principal, interest payments rise with inflation and fall with deflation." Id. The Treasury Department also issues various forms of savings bonds that can be purchased by individual investors, including Series EE and Series E savings bonds that once paid a variable interest rate but since 2005 new issues of this bond pay a fixed rate. "They are an accrual-type security, which means interest is added to the bond monthly and paid when you cash in the bond." Series EE Savings Bonds, TREASURYDIRECT, https://www.treasurydirect.gov/indiv/products/prod_eebonds_glance.htm [https://perma.cc/4VMQ-KTRB] (last visited Sept. 30, 2015). Series I savings bonds provide inflation protection. Series I Savings Bonds, TREASURYDIRECT, https://www.treasurydirect.gov/indiv/products/prod_ibonds_glance.htm [https://perma.cc/JN8R-KN52] (last visited Sept. 30, 2015). Series HH/H savings bonds "are current-income securities. You paid face value, and receive interest payments by direct deposit to your checking or savings account every 6 months until maturity or redemption." HH/H Savings Bonds, TREASURYDIRECT, https://www.treasurydirect.gov/indiv/products/prod_hhbonds_glance.htm [https://perma.cc/Y7GJ-768H] (last visited Sept. 30, 2015).  
44. Id.  
45. Id.  
46. Id.  
47. Id.  
48. Id.  
or discount margins (lowest to highest) until the quantity of accepted bids reaches the offering amount. All bidders, non-competitive and competitive, will receive the same rate, yield, or spread as the highest accepted bid.\footnote{Auctions, TREASURYDIRECT, supra note 43. This Dutch Auction procedure was adopted by the Treasury in 1974. Timeline of U.S. Treasury Auctions, TREASURYDIRECT, https://www.treasurydirect.gov/indiv/research/history/histtime/histtime_auctions.htm [https://perma.cc/DP2C-MH6G] (Nov. 21, 2016).}

The Treasury security currently being auctioned is said to be “on-the-run,” while its predecessor issue is said to be “off-the-run.”\footnote{51. In other words:

A Treasury security is “on-the-run” when it is the newest security issue of its maturity (e.g., in October the two-year note issued September 30 would be “on-the-run” while the two-year note issued August 31 would be “off-the-run”). An on-the-run security is normally the most liquid issue for that maturity.


Treasury securities may also be sold on a “when issued” basis prior to an auction, “which helps the market gauge demand and price the securities being offered . . .”.\footnote{52. DEP’T OF THE TREAS. J. REP. 2, supra note 38, at 1.}

Treasury auction procedures are governed by a set of rules designed to prevent efforts to manipulate Treasury security prices.\footnote{53. See 31 C.F.R. § 356 (2014).} Among other things, non-competitive bids are limited to $5 million and competitive bids are limited to thirty-five percent of the auction, less the bidder’s net long position.\footnote{54. 31 C.F.R. § 356.22 (2014). The net long position restriction is defined in 31 C.F.R. §356.13 (2014).}

Despite that limitation the Treasury auction was the target of a large-scale manipulation in February 1991.\footnote{55. United States v. Mozer, 828 F. Supp. 208, 209 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).}

The architect of that scheme was Paul Mozer,\footnote{56. Id.} a managing director of Salomon Brothers Inc., a primary dealer that was later acquired by Citigroup, Inc.\footnote{57. In re Gutfreund, Exchange Act Release No. 34-31554 (Dec. 3, 1992) (by consent).} Mozer, the head of the firm’s Government Trading Desk, submitted multiple thirty-five-percent bids in dummy names, allowing him to acquire for the firm’s proprietary position, an amount far in excess of the Treasury Department’s thirty-five-percent limitation for any one competitive bidder.\footnote{58. Mozer, 828 F. Supp. at 209.}

In an auction conducted on February 21, 1991, for $9 billion, Mozer submitted three bids, each for $3.15 billion.\footnote{59. In re Gutfreund, Exchange Act Release No. 34-31554 (Dec. 3, 1992) (by consent).} One of the bids was for Salomon Brothers and the other two were submitted in the names of two customers of
Salomon Brothers, i.e., the Quantum Fund and Mercury Asset Management. However, those customers had not authorized the bids and were unaware that they were submitted in their names. The bids were prorated, but this scheme still allowed Salomon Brothers to acquire almost fifty-seven percent of the auction.

An affiliate of Mercury Asset Management that was a primary dealer had submitted a bid in the auction that, when combined with the Mercury bid submitted by Mozer, put it over the thirty-five-percent limitation. This led to an inquiry by the Treasury Department, which eventually resulted in the unraveling of Mozer’s scheme.

Mozer then advised Salomon Brothers senior management of this inquiry and of his false bids. Those executives did nothing for several months, and Mozer employed this scheme in two subsequent Treasury auctions before the firm reported his conduct. Those executives were sanctioned by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for failing to supervise Mozer and for delaying the report of his conduct after it was first brought to their attention. Mozer pleaded guilty to criminal charges and was sentenced to four months in prison and fined $30,000. He also settled SEC charges by paying a $1 million civil penalty.

Salomon Brother’s large purchases raised concerns that it had engendered a “short squeeze,” i.e., a situation in which there is a shortage of securities for short sellers to cover their positions, causing them to pay higher prices for those securities. This was alleged to have occurred in instances where Salomon

60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
69. A short squeeze has been defined as follows:

When one market participant, or a group of market participants acting in concert, manages to purchase a significant proportion of the available supply of a particular security, that single participant or group is said to have “cornered the market[.]” When that happens, the single participant or group can withhold the securities from the market and at the same time demand the return of any securities that they have loaned to short sellers. In such a situation, the short sellers
Brothers bought up a larger percentage of Treasury auctions than permitted by Treasury auction rules.\textsuperscript{70} However, a private action seeking damages for that conduct was dismissed because the plaintiffs could not show how they were damaged by such conduct.\textsuperscript{71}

In a separate action the SEC charged that Steinhardt Management Co. and Caxton Corp. had established leveraged long positions in April 1991, two-year cash Treasury notes.\textsuperscript{72} Their combined positions constituted over 158 percent of the approximately $12 billion in notes that were issued in that auction.\textsuperscript{73} This squeezed traders that had sold short to Steinhardt and Caxton.\textsuperscript{74} Those short sellers had to make delivery by borrowing notes in the repo market or by buying notes in the cash market in which Caxton and Steinhardt held controlling positions.\textsuperscript{75} This forced the short sellers to pay artificial prices to Steinhardt and Caxton. Settlement was reached and the respondents agreed jointly to pay $76 million in fines and disgorgement of profits.\textsuperscript{76}

Following the Salomon Brothers scandal, Treasury changed some of its auction procedures. Legislation that was passed in 1975 also authorized Treasury to require large traders in Treasury securities to report their positions.\textsuperscript{77} However, this did not end concerns over the manipulation of Treasury auction prices. In 2015, the CFTC and Department of Justice began far ranging investigations into the conduct of the prime dealers in order to determine if they were manipulating auction prices.\textsuperscript{78} The New York State Department of Financial Services regulator also subpoenaed nine large banks seeking information on their Treasury auction activities.\textsuperscript{79} The regulators were seeking to determine if the large banks and other prime dealers were artificially depressing Treasury

\textsuperscript{70} Id. at C-6.
\textsuperscript{73} Id.
\textsuperscript{74} Id.
\textsuperscript{75} Id.
\textsuperscript{76} Id.
\textsuperscript{79} Id.
prices in order to allow them to profit on other positions. This probe followed massive settlements with regulators totaling $9 billion by many of those same banks concerning charges that they had manipulated the Libor and other benchmark interest rates. In other settlements, these banks paid $10 billion to settle government charges that they manipulated foreign currency exchange prices.

D. Secondary Market

The value of Treasury securities after being auctioned will fluctuate as interest rates change or economic conditions, such as inflation or recession, affect their value. This has resulted in the development of a secondary market in these securities. Traders may seek profits from such fluctuations. This secondary market is also important to the Fed’s efforts to control interest rates through its open market operations. These operations are the responsibility of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), which has twelve voting members, i.e., the seven Fed members, plus the president of the New York Fed and four of the other eleven regional Fed presidents on a rotating basis. The FOMC oversees “the Fed’s buying and selling of government securities, the primary tool through which the Fed determine[s] short-term interest rates and influence[s] the money supply.”

80. Id.
83. See generally DEP’T OF THE TREAS. J. REP. 1, supra note 1, at 2.
85. Id. at 48.
86. Id. As the Fed has described those operations: Open market operations (OMOs)—the purchase and sale of securities in the open market by a central bank—are a key tool used by the Federal Reserve in the implementation of monetary policy. Historically, the Federal Reserve has used OMOs to adjust the supply of reserve balances so as to keep the federal funds rate around the target federal funds rate established by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). OMOs are conducted by the Trading Desk at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
The secondary market for Treasury securities provides other important functions. For example, its prices are benchmarks for other assets. This is because Treasury securities are viewed as setting the risk-free rate for lending. Non-U.S. Treasury securities will pay a higher return than a Treasury security of the same tenor. That premium is based on the amount of risk of default of the non-Treasury instrument over that of the U.S. government. The secondary market in Treasury securities also acts as a source of liquidity for short-term working capital for many large businesses and is a popular source of collateral for the multi-trillion-dollar tri-party repo market.


87. DEP’T OF THE TREAS. J. REP. 1, supra note 1, at 1.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Tracy Alloway, Big Investors Replace Banks in $4.2tn Repo Market, FIN. TIMES (LONDON) (May 29, 2014), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ca529c5e-e5db-11e3-aefc-00144feabd0.html#axzz3nnZVo5O0. As the Fed has described the repo market:

A repo is the sale of a security, or a portfolio of securities, combined with an agreement to repurchase the security or portfolio on a specified future date at a prearranged price. Aside from some legal distinctions concerning bankruptcy treatment, a repo is similar to a collateralized loan . . . For the opening leg of the repo, an institution with cash to invest, the cash provider, purchases securities from an institution looking to borrow cash, the collateral provider.

In most segments of the U.S. repo market, at least one of the counterparties is a securities dealer. Dealers use the repo market to finance their inventories of securities, among other purposes. In some cases, the collateral provider is a client of the dealer that wants to borrow cash. On these repos, the dealer is the cash provider. Repos involve a variety of other cash providers, including money market funds (MMFs), asset managers, securities lending agents, and investors looking to obtain specific securities as collateral in order to hedge or speculate based on changes in the market values of those securities.


These clearing banks play a number of important roles as intermediaries. They take custody of the securities involved in the repo, value the securities and make sure that the specified margin is applied, settle the transaction on their books, and offer services to help dealers optimize the use of their collateral. The clearing banks do not, however, match dealers with cash investors, nor do they play the role of broker in that market.

To give dealers access to their securities during the day, the clearing banks settle all repos early each day, returning cash to cash investors and collateral to dealers. Because of the delay in settlement, the clearing banks wind up extending hundreds of billions of intraday credit to the dealers until new repos are settled in
The secondary market for U.S. Treasury securities is "one of the world’s largest and most liquid financial markets." Over $500 billion in treasury securities are purchased and sold daily. It is a "virtual round-the-clock market" that operates with trade sizes of $1 million for Treasury notes and $5 million for Treasury bills. Most Treasury securities are traded electronically and, like other securities markets, have been the subject of high-frequency traders who use algorithms to try and take advantage of even small price fluctuations.

Trading in the secondary market "takes place between primary dealers, nonprimary dealers, and customers of these dealers, including financial institutions, nonfinancial institutions, and individuals." At the center of the market are a small number of "interdealers" who provide other dealers with quotes showing the best bid and offer prices among the dealers for particular Treasury securities at the evening.


92. Thayer, supra note 90.


Secondary dealers are to be distinguished from primary dealers who purchase securities directly from the Federal Reserve. Savings and loan associations and local governments make up a significant number of customers engaging in repo transactions with secondary dealers. Other customers include money market and mutual funds, pension funds, insurance, financial and other corporations, and foreign investors.

In re Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Mgmt. Corp., 878 F.2d 742, 743 (3d Cir. 1989).
securities. The primary dealers are the most active participants in this secondary market.

Treasury securities transactions in the secondary market are conducted across multiple venues, including interdealer trading on electronic trading platforms and dealer-to-customer trades on a bilateral basis electronically or by voice orders. Market makers provide liquidity to this market. As a Fed publication notes:

Many dealers, particularly the primary dealers, “make markets” in Treasury securities by standing ready to buy and sell securities at specified prices. In the process of making markets, dealers purchase securities at the bid price and sell the same securities at a slightly higher price, the offer price. Through these sales and purchases, the dealer can facilitate transactions between customers while taking only temporary positions in the security. In doing so, the dealer earns the difference between the bid and offer prices, referred to as the bid-offer spread.

III. REGULATORY STRUCTURE

A. Banking and SEC Regulatory Jurisdiction

Regulatory jurisdiction over the Treasury market has been allocated among several regulators, including the Treasury, the Fed, the New York Fed, other “appropriate” banking regulators, and the SEC. As described above, the Treasury conducts and regulates the auctions for the issuance of U.S. Treasury securities. The Fed and New York Fed conduct open market operations for adjusting the money supply through the primary dealers appointed by the New

96. Dupont & Sack, supra note 95, at 789.
97. Id. at 785.
98. DEP’T OF THE TREAS. J. REP. 1, supra note 1, at 11.
100. DEP’T OF THE TREAS. J. REP. 2, supra note 38, at 3.
101. As one government report has noted: Compliance and enforcement responsibility for the auction rules rests with the Treasury. The Treasury may bar or suspend a firm from auctions, and the Treasury reserves the right to reject bids in auctions. However, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), the Treasury, and the self-regulatory organizations (“SROs”) are not authorized to examine government securities firms for compliance with Treasury auction rules.

DEP’T OF THE TREAS. J. REP. 2, supra note 38, at xi. The Fed works with Treasury to check Treasury auction bids for authenticity. Id. at xiii.
York Fed and other market participants.\textsuperscript{102}

U.S. Government securities are treated as "exempt" securities under the Securities Act of 1933, which means that they did not have to be registered with the SEC.\textsuperscript{103} However, exempt securities are subject to SEC antifraud rules.\textsuperscript{104} Until 1986, dealers in exempt securities were not required to register with the SEC.\textsuperscript{105} That situation changed, however, after a number of scandals arose in the 1980s involving government securities sales and repo transactions involving government securities. Between 1975 and 1985, failures of government bond dealers caused losses of nearly $1 billion. Most of those losses were associated with repo transactions.\textsuperscript{106}

Drysdale Government Securities was one such failure. In 1982, it defaulted on $279 million in payments due to repo customers.\textsuperscript{107} The failure of Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Management Corp., another repo dealer, resulted in losses of $150 million in 1985.\textsuperscript{108} The bankruptcy of E.S.M. Government Securities ("ESM"), a repo dealer based in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, resulted in losses of some $250 million.\textsuperscript{109} The collapse of ESM also caused the failure of

\textsuperscript{102} Id. at x. After the Salomon Brothers auction scandal regulation of the primary dealers was changed so that
direct regulatory authority over primary dealers will rest unambiguously with the primary regulator - in most cases, the SEC. Although the FRBNY has no statutory authority to regulate the primary dealers, the primary dealer system may have generated the false impression in the marketplace that the FRBNY somehow regulates or takes responsibility for the conduct of primary dealers. To make clear that its relationship with the primary dealers is solely a business relationship, the FRBNY will eliminate its dealer surveillance program, while upgrading its market surveillance program . . . .


\textsuperscript{104} DEP’T OF THE TREAS. J. REP. 2, supra note 38, at xi.


the Home State Savings Bank in Cincinnati, Ohio. The failure of Home State exhausted the Ohio thrift insurance fund and set off a run on other savings and loan associations. This caused the governor of Ohio to suspend the operations of all state thrift associations until they could obtain federal insurance.

The Government Securities Act of 1986 (GSA) was passed in response to these failures. "Financial institutions," such as banks, that acted as dealers in government securities were subjected to regulation by the “appropriate regulatory agency.” Non-banks acting as dealers in such securities were required to register with the SEC or to give notice of such activity if already registered with the SEC as a broker-dealer. Treasury was directed by the GSA to adopt rules to govern the operations of government securities dealers and brokers, including those registered with the SEC.

The SEC regulated automated trading systems (ATS) by requiring them to register as broker-dealers. That requirement subjected those electronic trading platforms to the full panoply of SEC regulations that govern nearly every aspect of a broker-dealer’s operations. However, ATS’s trading only U.S. government securities was exempted from that registration requirement and hence also from other SEC rules governing broker-dealers.

B. CFTC Jurisdiction

Treasury market debt instruments are the subject of trading in derivative instruments in the commodity markets, including futures, options, and swaps. The Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 (“CEA”) granted the CFTC exclusive jurisdiction over futures contracts on U.S. government securities, as well as

111. Id.
112. Id.
115. Id.
118. Id.
other commodities that are traded on exchanges registered with that agency. The CFTC has authority to bring manipulation charges where the price of a futures contract or its underlying commodity is manipulated. The CFTC also has authority to police abusive trading activities on the commodity exchanges such as wash sales, fictitious trades, and “spoofing.”

The Treasury futures market on the floor of the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) was the subject of a bizarre fraud scheme by a group of individuals in 1988. They used wigs and other disguises, as well as fake trading credentials, to gain access to the Treasury bond pit for a period of about one year. Through the use of those disguises they were able to make risk free trades by claiming profitable trades and ignoring unprofitable trades.

An almost equally bizarre effort to manipulate the Treasury market on the CBOT occurred in 1992, an affair that was conducted by two individuals who tried to use the principles of mass psychology to manipulate the market. They would do this by selling large amounts of options and futures, which would cause other traders to sell in the belief that the market was in decline. That reaction in turn drove the market down further, and the conspirators then covered their positions at a profit. The conspirators were able to access the services of a CBOT clearing firm by misrepresenting their finances and by presenting a large worthless check. They also obtained CBOT memberships, all of which were needed to allow them to trade on the floor. They began their scheme on October 21, 1992, and made $1 million within a frame of a few minutes of trading. However, the scheme quickly fell apart when exchange officials questioned what they were doing. The conspirators were then forced to liquidate their positions with a loss of $8.5 million, which destroyed their clearing firm. One of the conspirators fled to Canada, and the other was convicted of fraud and sentenced to forty-two months imprisonment.
In another action that was settled by consent, the CFTC found that the respondent had engaged in manipulation of the prices of the June 1993, ten-year U.S. Treasury note futures contract that was traded on the CBOT. The respondent was found to have engaged in that manipulation by obtaining a dominant portion of the available supply of the cheapest delivery Treasury notes for the June futures contract. The respondent also entered into repo transactions that further tightened available supplies, and it withheld its notes from the market. This required the shorts to deliver more expensive Treasury securities.

Another case involved charges that Pacific Investment Management Co., LLC (PIMCO), manipulated the Treasury market in futures for ten-year Treasury notes in May and June 2005. The Seventh Circuit upheld the district court's certification of a class action for investors in those notes, allowing them to pursue claims that PIMCO violated the anti-manipulation provisions of the CEA. This action was later settled for $92 million.

In In re Murphy, the CFTC considered a trading practice known as a "ginzy" involving futures contracts for United States Treasury Bonds on the CBOT. The traders involved in those transactions were seeking to avoid the minimum price fluctuation requirement (ticks) of one thirty-second of one percent. Because of changes in the tax laws, the nature of the trading in the futures contract changed, making smaller minimum ticks desirable. Local floor traders then devised the ginzy, in which a local trader traded against part of a floor broker's customer order at a disadvantageous price, with the understanding that the floor trader would participate at a more favorable price in the remainder of the same order. The CFTC found that such trading was non-competitive in violation of the CEA's prohibition against such activity.

A trader on the CBOT, David G. Sklena, made $1.65 million in profits...
through trading in the five-year Treasury note futures on April 2, 2004.\textsuperscript{146} He made those profits by using the volatility caused by better-than-expected employment numbers to disguise noncompetitive trades that ripped off customers.\textsuperscript{147} Sklena was subsequently convicted of criminal charges for defrauding customers and manipulating prices.\textsuperscript{148}

In still another case, \textit{In re Moster},\textsuperscript{149} the CFTC found by consent that a trader for Bank of America had booked fictitious trades that inflated the value of his trading book in Treasury futures by over $12 million.\textsuperscript{150} Still another example of prohibited fictitious trading is found in \textit{In re BlackRock Institutional Trust Co.},\textsuperscript{151} a CFTC administrative proceeding where it was found by consent that employees of Blackrock and JPMorgan entered into prearranged fictitious trades of Treasury note futures spreads.\textsuperscript{152} The orders were entered through different brokerage firms about one minute apart, were intended to meet and match each other, and were structured to achieve that effect.\textsuperscript{153}

The Treasury market was the subject of an insider trading scandal after it was discovered that, on October 31, 2001, Peter J. Davis, a consultant for Goldman Sachs, provided John M. Youngdahl, a Goldman Sachs employee with non-public information contained in an embargoed Treasury announcement.\textsuperscript{154} Davis also tipped the Massachusetts Financial Services Co. with that information.\textsuperscript{155} The non-public information was that Treasury was discontinuing the thirty-year Treasury bond, which would increase the value of the remaining outstanding thirty-year bonds.\textsuperscript{156} Youngdahl made large purchases of thirty-year bonds before the public announcement of its discontinuance, as did the Massachusetts Financial Services Co.\textsuperscript{157} These players were all sanctioned by the SEC by consent and Youngdahl pleaded guilty to criminal charges and was sentenced to thirty-three months in prison.\textsuperscript{158} However, class action and other claims over charges that this conduct violated the anti-manipulation provisions

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{146. United States v. Sklena, 692 F3d. 725, 727 (7th Cir. 2012).}
\footnote{147. Id.}
\footnote{148. See United States v. Sklena, No. 09 CR 302, at 1 (N.D. Ill. May 9, 2011).}
\footnote{149. \textit{In re Moster}, CFTC No. 09-08, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 31, 314 (Feb. 11, 2009).}
\footnote{150. Id.}
\footnote{152. Id.}
\footnote{153. Id.}
\footnote{154. Premium Plus Partners, L.P. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 648 F.3d 533, 534 (7th Cir. 2011).}
\footnote{155. Complaint ¶ 1, SEC v. Davis, No. 03-cv6672 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2003).}
\footnote{156. 648 F.3d at 534.}
\footnote{157. Complaint, \textit{supra} note 155, ¶¶ 5–6, 9.}
\footnote{158. 648 F.3d at 534.}
\end{footnotes}
of the CEA were rejected and then settled for a small amount.159

Treasury bond futures have also been associated with some old-fashioned retail customer fraud. In CFTC v. Liberty Financial Trading Corp.,160 a district court, by consent, enjoined the defendants who had been making false statements in soliciting customers in trading Treasury bond put options.161 Customers were told they would double their money because the war in Iraq would lead to a rise in the stock market and a corresponding drop in the value of Treasury bonds.162 The firm failed to disclose that over ninety percent of its customers had lost money.163

C. U.S. Treasury Market Volatility on October 15, 2014

Volatility in the U.S. Treasury market on October 14, 2014, led to a study by multiple agencies of that event and a governmental review of the adequacy of regulation over this market.164 The report resulting from that study (the Joint Study) found that the market for U.S. Treasury securities, futures, and other closely related financial markets experienced an unusually high level of volatility on that day.165 “Although trading volumes were high and the market continued to function, liquidity conditions became significantly strained.”166 The ten-year Treasury note experienced a highly unusual thirty-seven-basis-point up-and-down trading range.167 “Intraday changes of greater magnitude have been seen on only three occasions since 1998 and, unlike October 15, all were driven by significant policy announcements.”168

The Joint Study determined that volatility on October 15, 2014, was unconnected with any significant policy announcement and was concentrated in a twelve-minute period.169 “For such significant volatility and a large round-trip in prices to occur in so short a time with no obvious catalyst is unprecedented

159. Id. at 535.
161. Id. at 1–2, 5.
162. Id. at 7.
163. Id. at 8.
164. See generally DEP’T OF THE TREAS. J. REP. 1, supra note 1. This study was conducted by the staffs of the Treasury, the Fed, New York Fed Bank, the SEC, and CFTC. Id.
165. Id. at 1.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 8.
in the recent history of the Treasury market."  

Market liquidity also experienced a "dramatic decline" in the hour that proceeded twelve minutes of unusual volatility. Market depth, as measured by standing quotes in order books, declined and transaction costs increased even though trading volume reached record highs.

The Joint Study observed that a small number of principal trading firms (PTFs), i.e., firms trading for their own accounts, accounted for most of the trading activity of those firms. The Joint Study also observed that the growth in HFTs was allowing PTFs to account for a majority of trading volume in the market and to provide "the vast majority of market depth." This market dominance by PTFs was supplanting the historical dominance of bank-dealers in the interdealer Treasury market. Derivatives trading by PTFs was also shifting the center of the Treasury market from New York to Chicago.

On October 15, 2014, PTFs accounted for more than fifty percent of trading volume in both the Treasury cash and futures markets and bank dealers were responsible for some thirty to forty percent of volume. This trading was further concentrated in the most active PTFs and bank dealers. However the Joint Study's analysis of data on these and other traders did not reveal a single cause for the extraordinary volatility on October 15, 2014. The Joint Study did note that the growth of electronic trading had transformed the Treasury market's participants. Among other things it gave rise to dominance in trading

170. Id. at 1.
171. Id. at 3. Liquidity was defined by the joint study of this event "as the cost associated with executing a trade." Id. The Joint Study also stated that:

Another manner in which liquidity might be viewed is across an immediacy spectrum. Through that lens, liquid markets are those where participants are able to continuously transact even if there is little market depth and prices are very responsive to incoming orders to buy or sell securities.

Id. at 8.
172. Id. at 3.
173. Id. at 4.
174. Id. at 6.
175. Id.
177. DEP'T OF TREAS. J. REP. 1, supra note 1, at 21.
178. Id. at 22.
179. Id. at 33.
180. The Joint Study noted that:

Until 1992, . . . the interdealer brokers only allowed primary dealers, as designated by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, to access their trading platforms. In 1992, the interdealer brokers expanded access to all entities that were
Electronic trading also raised questions about evolving risks in the Treasury market. Those risks include operational risks from malfunctioning algorithms; market liquidity risks from abrupt changes in market trading strategies; market integrity risks from price manipulations; transmission risks from erroneous cross-market orders; clearing and settlement risks from bi-lateral, non-centrally cleared trades; and risk management risks from the inability to protect against unexpected margin demands from HFT.

The Joint Study recommended further study of the evolution of the U.S. Treasury market. It also recommended the strengthening of monitoring and surveillance of the market and the promotion of inter-agency coordination related to the regulation of this market. In furtherance of those recommendations, on October 2015, the SEC, CFTC, and bank regulators met to consider whether additional regulation was needed to assure the integrity of the Treasury market. The SEC Chair announced that the SEC was considering whether a registration requirement should be imposed on ATS trading U.S. government securities. The Chair of the CFTC stated that his agency was also considering registration requirements for firms dealing in derivatives on U.S. Treasury securities. Additionally, the CFTC was considering requiring “pre-trade risk controls such as ‘message throttles’ and maximum order size limits . . . [and] new requirements for the design, testing and supervision of automated trading

netting members of the Government Securities Clearing Corporation (now the Fixed Income Clearing Corporation, or FICC). Over time, other entities gained access to the platforms through their prime brokers, who themselves had access, and the platforms in recent years granted direct access to an even wider range of participants, including those outside the FICC netting membership. In particular, PTFs gained access to the platforms in the mid-2000s.

Id. at 35–36.
181. Id. at 36.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 54–55.
184. Id. at 45.
185. Id.
187. Id.
systems and ‘kill switches,’ which shut down runaway algorithms.” Still another proposal would require dealers to report completed trades as a means of adding transparency to the market.

In January 2016, Treasury sought public comment on the ongoing evolution of the Treasury market and information on who are the primary drivers of this market restructuring and the implications of this change on liquidity and market functionality. It also sought comment on the need for additional data access and further reports to the public of transaction data. Concerns were also being expressed over a study that showed that high-frequency traders create an illusion of liquidity in the treasuries market.

IV. CONSOLIDATING REGULATION

A. Functional Regulation

The regulatory structure in the U.S. is based on a “functional” regulatory model in which the same financial product is regulated by a designated regulator wherever the product is traded. For example, the SEC is assigned the regulation of securities trading, the CFTC is assigned the responsibility for regulating derivative instruments such as futures contracts, and banking regulators regulate banking activities. As a Group of 30 Report notes:

Under the Functional Approach, supervisory oversight is determined by the business that is being transacted by the entity, without regard to its legal status. Each type of business may have its own functional regulator. For example, under a “pure” Functional Approach, if a single entity were engaged in multiple businesses that included banking, securities, and insurance activities, each of those distinct lines of business would be overseen by a separate, “functional” regulator.

189. Id.
192. Id.
196. GRP. OF THIRTY, THE STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL SUPERVISION: APPROACHES AND
As the Group of 30 Report also notes, the functional regulator is "responsible for both safety and soundness oversight of the entity and business conduct regulation." Functional regulation thus contains two principal elements: (1) "prudential" regulation and (2) "business conduct." Both of these elements are carried out by a single designated regulator for each product.

"Prudential supervision has historically focused on the safety and soundness of individual financial firms, or, in the case of BHCs [bank holding companies], on the risks that an organization's non-depository subsidiaries pose to its depository institution subsidiaries." Prudential regulation includes "clear rules on criteria for entry, capital adequacy standards, asset diversification, limits on loans to insiders, permissible range of activities, asset classification and provisioning, external audits, enforcement powers, and failure resolution mechanisms."

Prudential regulation may for example, require financial institutions to maintain a cushion of equity or liquid unencumbered funds. Those requirements seek to assure that liquid funds will be available to meet customer demands in the event the institution encounters financial difficulties. Prudential regulation may also include prohibitions from engaging in speculative activities that might endanger the financial institution.

In contrast to prudential regulation, business conduct regulations focus on activities by financial institutions that might harm customers or market participants such as misleading sales activities or manipulation of market prices.
“Business conduct regulation has a quite different focus from safety and soundness oversight. Its emphasis is on transparency, disclosure, suitability, and investor protection. It is designed to ensure fair dealing.”

Business conduct regulation involves consumer protection, and antifraud and anti-manipulation measures, including consumer warnings concerning the risks of particular financial products. With respect to fraud, the SEC has broadly interpreted its general anti-fraud rule to proscribe everything from insider trading to misstatements of the risks of an investment. The CFTC and the SEC also bring enforcement actions against traders seeking to manipulate prices to an artificial level by market power or practices deemed to be improper.

The business conduct cases brought by the CFTC and SEC are usually the result of lengthy investigations that may involve subpoenaed documents and witnesses. Their enforcement cases may be brought administratively or in federal court, where injunctions, large fines, and restitution may be demanded. Prudential regulation rarely involves publicly announced enforcement actions, while business conduct regulation involves public enforcement proceedings that are often the subject of much publicity.

Functional regulators have not generally proved adept at fulfilling the dual roles of prudential and business conduct regulation. Bank regulators focus on “safety and soundness” issues, which encompass fraud but focus more on financial stability issues that relate to prudential regulation. The bank regulators tend to work quietly with the banks through a continuous audit process in

205. Id.
206. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 1.55 (CFTC risk disclosure document required to be given to futures customers).
207. See JERRY W. MARKHAM & RIGERS GJYSHI, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SECURITIES REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES, EDS., ch. 13 (2014) (describing the application of that rule).
208. See MARKHAM, supra note 5, at 252–57 (describing those prohibitions).
211. Id.
212. As one report notes:

Safety and soundness regulations for banks consist of basically five components: federal deposit insurance to reduce the likelihood of bank runs and panics; deposit interest ceilings to reduce the costs of bank deposits and weaken banks’ incentives to invest in risky assets; regulatory monitoring to ensure that banks do not invest in excessively risky assets, have sufficient capital given their risk, have no fraudulent activities, and have competent management; capital requirements to provide incentives for banks not to take excessive risk; and portfolio restrictions to prohibit investment in risky assets.
which bank examiners seek to ferret out unsafe and unsound practices.\textsuperscript{213} Although bank regulators may impose business restrictions for business misconduct, they do not typically employ investigative programs that seek to ferret out fraud.\textsuperscript{214} In recent years, however, bank regulators have been piggybacking on CFTC and SEC cases where a bank is involved and fraud or price manipulation of a bank product is claimed.\textsuperscript{215} This was done in the interest rate and foreign currency benchmark manipulation cases.\textsuperscript{216} However, these multiple actions by multiple regulators for the same conduct serve no useful purpose.

In contrast, the SEC is primarily an "enforcement agency" for violations of business conduct requirements.\textsuperscript{217} That agency is very aggressive in pursuing fraud, manipulation and business practices that might affect consumers. The CFTC has taken a similar approach. The model for both of those agencies is thus to seek headlines through high profile cases charging business misconduct.\textsuperscript{218} Unfortunately, experience has proved that these regulators are not able to act effectively as both a prudential and business conduct regulator. For example, in an effort to impose prudential regulation over the large investment banks it regulated, the SEC adopted a Consolidated Supervised Entities system for assuring those firms remained viable in times of economic distress.\textsuperscript{219} The result was disaster during the Financial Crisis in 2008 when all but two of those firms failed because of lack of capital or liquidity.\textsuperscript{220} The two survivors, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley became chartered banks that are now regulated by banking authorities.\textsuperscript{221} The CFTC also experienced some significant prudential failures that involved some of the largest futures commission merchants that it regulated.\textsuperscript{222}

An SEC Chair admitted that the agency was ill-suited for the role of a prudential regulator, noting that such supervision "really required more of a bank-

\textsuperscript{213} \textit{See} BROOME \& MARKHAM, \textit{supra} note 202, at 570–75 (describing the goals of these examinations).

\textsuperscript{214} \textit{See} id. at 577–82 (describing bank regulator enforcement powers).


\textsuperscript{216} \textit{See supra} note 7 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{217} \textit{Bernanke, supra} note 84, at 250.

\textsuperscript{218} \textit{See generally id.} at 95–96.

\textsuperscript{219} \textit{See generally id.} at 250.

\textsuperscript{220} \textit{See generally id.} at 260, 270.

\textsuperscript{221} \textit{Id.} at 310–11.

\textsuperscript{222} \textit{See} MARKHAM, \textit{supra} note 215, at 108–23 (describing those failures).
ing regulators’ sort of approach” instead of her agency’s “disclosure and enforcement mentality.”223 This is because prudential and business conduct regulation require different mindsets. The banking regulators have proved to be more adept at prudential regulation, but rarely bring any business conduct actions, preferring instead to gently admonish or ignore bad practices.224 This is exemplified by the preemption by bank regulators of state laws that sought to curb lending abuses in subprime lending before the Financial Crisis in 2008.225 After preempting some strong state measures that sought to curb such abuses, the bank regulators were accused of failing to take effective action on their own to deal with those problems before the exposure of widespread fraud and abuses in that market.226 Congress reacted to that laxity by including provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010 to limit the bank regulators’ preemption powers in the future.227 However, Congress kept the banking regulators as business conduct regulators over such practices.228

B. Functional Regulation Has Been Undermined

At one time a functional regulatory system had some logical basis. For example, before the 1970s, futures trading was conducted largely on agricultural products that were of little interest to Wall Street broker-dealers and investment banks.229 This effectively walled off LaSalle Street from Wall Street in the trading of futures, and separate regulation possibly made some sense.230 Today, however, most futures and derivatives are traded on financial instruments.231 History also drove the creation of functional regulation in other areas of finance. As a former Fed chairman Ben Bernanke has noted:

Historically, regulatory agencies were created ad hoc in response to crises and other events—the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency during the Civil War, the Federal Reserve after

223. BERNAKE, supra note 84, at 250–51 n.*.
224. See MARKHAM, supra note 35, at 396.
225. See id. at 396–98.
227. See BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 202, at 212.
228. See id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 287–88 (describing the change from the dominance of agricultural to financial derivatives).
the Panic of 1907, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) during the Depression. Politically, conflicts between competing power centers within government (congressional committees with overlapping jurisdictions, state versus federal regulators) and special interests, such as the banking and housing lobbies, have routinely blocked attempts to rationalize and improve the existing system.\textsuperscript{232}

The "functional" system of regulation began to lose its value as financial services became integrated over the years.\textsuperscript{233} As an SEC Chairman asserted in 1986:

\begin{quote}
[A]s a result of new economic opportunities and telecommunication technology, the traditional gaps between these industries have been bridged through major mergers and acquisitions and by new financial products and services - some of which compete on the basis of their regulatory classifications, rather than their economic merits.
\end{quote}

Regulatory overlaps, duplications and conflicts have also multiplied. Today, 10 federal and over 100 state agencies regulate various aspects of the securities markets alone. Regulation of the securities registration and reporting requirements of about 400 publicly-owned banks and 300 savings and loan associations are divided among four federal agencies. Over 1,000 bank and S&L holding companies and the 10,000 other publicly-owned corporations file with the SEC.\textsuperscript{234}

Former Fed chairman Ben Bernanke also noted that this functional regulatory system is also "highly fragmented and full of gaps."\textsuperscript{235} "Important parts of the financial system . . . [are] inadequately overseen (if overseen at all) and, critically, no agency had responsibility for the system as a whole."\textsuperscript{236} As another source notes:

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{232} BERNANKE, supra note 84, at 95.
\textsuperscript{234} Id.
\textsuperscript{235} BERNANKE, supra note 84, at 94–95.
\textsuperscript{236} Id. at 95. Bernanke also noted that under the functional regulatory model:

The result was a muddle. For example, regulation of financial markets (such as the stock market and futures markets) is split between the SEC and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, an agency created by Congress in 1974. The regulation of banks is dictated by the charter under which each bank operates. While banks chartered at the federal level, so-called national banks, are regulated by the OCC, banks chartered by state authorities are overseen by state regulators.
\end{quote}
Regulation of Treasuries is splintered between the SEC, CFTC, Treasury, Federal Reserve and New York Fed. Though the agencies have been working together in recent months, they don’t always get along. Each has its own interests and turf to protect.237

The haphazard nature of the present functional regulatory structure is particularly evident with respect to the insurance industry, which has no overall federal regulator.238 Instead, fifty states and the District of Columbia each have their own regulators, with their own rules and enforcement authorities that employ some 12,500 regulatory personnel.239 This regulation includes licensing, examinations, capital and reserve requirements, product regulation, and rate approval.240 Those state regulators try to coordinate their regulation through the National Association of Insurance Commissioners.241 Nevertheless, differences remain. For example, some states require prior approval of health insurance rates, while others do not.242

The McCarran-Ferguson Act, which was passed in 1945, bars regulation of the insurance industry on the federal level.243 There were calls for federal regulation after the failure of several insurance companies during the last half of the twentieth century.244 However, the insurance industry has a strong lobby and has avoided such regulation.245 Still, functional regulation is not seamless in the insurance industry. For example, the SEC jointly regulates with the states...
variable annuity or other insurance products that tie payments to securities market performance. The SEC applies business conduct regulation to those products, but leaves to the states the task of conducting prudential regulation over those products. Adding to this patchwork of regulation is the application of the disclosure requirements in the federal securities laws to the issuance of stock by insurance companies to their shareholders. That role has increased in this century with the demutualization of many insurance companies.

Many large insurance companies have also created operating affiliates that offer financial services outside their traditional insurance lines of business. Those affiliates may be regulated by the SEC or other functional regulator for particular products. Some insurance companies also merged with other financial services as exemplified by the acquisition by General Electric of insurance companies and by the merger of Citigroup and the Travelers Insurance Co. Regulation failed to keep pace with that transformation. This was evidenced by the failure of AIG during the Financial Crisis in 2008. AIG’s losses resulted in a highly controversial $182 billion bailout by the federal government because federal bank regulators thought that it posed a systemic risk to the economy.

AIG was one of the largest international insurance companies, but it was brought down by the non-regulated activities of affiliates. AIG was able to evade regulation of its non-insurance affiliates by state insurance regulators.

249. See MARKHAM, supra note 106, 234–35 (describing that demutualization).
250. Id. at 233.
251. Id. at 232.
252. Id. at 235, 324.
254. Id.
255. BERNANKE, supra note 84, at 271–72.
256. Id.
This was made possible because the AIG holding company owned a small savings and loan bank, which allowed the holding company structure to be supervised by the federal Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS). Regulation by OTS was ineffective, and it was abolished by the Dodd-Frank Act. In response to the AIG failure and other concerns, the Dodd-Frank Act also created a Federal Insurance Office (FIO) located in the Treasury that was given authority to monitor all aspects of the insurance sector and “to represent the United States on prudential aspects of international insurance matters, including at the International Association of Insurance Supervisors.”

The FIO was also designated as a non-voting member of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), the super-regulator created by Dodd-Frank to regulate systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs), including insurance companies. FSOC also has non-voting members that are representatives of state insurance, banking, and securities regulators. To date, FSOC has designated three insurance companies as being systemically important. The Financial Stability Board (FSB), which operates under theegis of the Group of Twenty (G-20) that coordinates regulation internationally, has also designated nine global insurers, including three in the U.S., as systemically important.

The fact that all fifty states and the District of Columbia have separate regulators for their banking and securities, as well as insurance, businesses is inconsistent with the theory of functional regulation. That overlapping regulation has been ameliorated to some extent over the years by legislation or agency actions that preempt state regulation in areas heavily regulated at the federal level. For example, the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 preempted much of the state regulations previously imposed on broker-

257. Id.
258. Id. at 271–72, 463.
261. Id.
dealers dealing in nationally traded securities. However, preemption raises concerns over state rights and the ability of federal regulators to provide comprehensive protection. Much criticism was directed at banking regulators for preempting state regulation of improper lending practices in subprime residential loans before the Financial Crisis in 2008. The Dodd-Frank Act sought to curtail such preemptive acts in the future.

The functional regulation model at the federal level has also been substantially eroded over the years. For example, as noted above, the Government Securities Act of 1986 (GSA) required non-banks acting as broker-dealers in government securities to register with the SEC, while banks were subjected to regulation by the “appropriate regulatory agency.” At the same time, Treasury was assigned the task of adopting rules for the SEC regulated government securities dealers as well as for the banks. Those rules address the financial responsibility, protection of customer securities and balances, recordkeeping, and reporting of brokers and dealers in government securities. Treasury modeled those rules after existing SEC rules for broker-dealers that govern the protection of funds of customers. Among other things, the Treasury’s capital rule allowed government securities broker-dealers registered with the SEC to comply with the SEC’s capital rule and financial institutions to comply with bank regulator capital requirements.

The GSA also divided enforcement and examination authority over government securities dealers among the SEC, FINRA, and the appropriate bank regulatory authorities. However, the GSA continued to apply the anti-fraud and anti-manipulation prohibitions contained in the federal securities laws to all government securities brokers and dealers. This overlap was also apparent when the SEC and the Treasury Department announced in May 2016, that they were requesting FINRA to consider whether it could impose a requirement that

266. See MARKHAM, supra note 35, at 393–99 (describing that criticism).
270. Id.
273. DEP’T OF THE TREAS. J. REP. 1, supra note 1, at 9. Not all FINRA rules apply to government securities dealers registered with the SEC, such as those governing pricing and commissions. Id. at n.5.
274. Id. at 9.

This allocation of jurisdiction among multiple regulators breaches a basic principle of functional regulation, i.e., one product, one regulator for both prudential and business conduct. Instead, under the GSA, multiple regulators regulate the same product prudentially under their own rules, while the SEC was made the sole business conduct regulator in so far as the conduct involves fraud or manipulation.\footnote{Markham, \textit{supra} note 10, at 849.}

The GSA has not been the only breach of functional regulation. The foreign exchange market is regulated by multiple regulators that share both prudential and business conduct authority.\footnote{See \textit{id.} at 851.} The foreign exchange market is regulated by five U.S. regulators: the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Fed).\footnote{\textit{id.} at 854.}

In recent years, they have filed coordinated and joint actions against several banks over currency manipulations that all made essentially the same charges.\footnote{\textit{id.} at 855-56.} That market is also regulated internationally by U.S. and several foreign regulators, as well as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel Committee) that was created by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) in 1974.\footnote{BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, \textit{A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE BASEL COMMITTEE} (Oct. 2015), http://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.htm [https://perma.cc/UM3K-MMFQ].}

Another breakdown in functional regulation occurred in 1975 after Congress sought to resolve a jurisdictional war between the SEC and bank regulators over who would regulate the clearing and settlement of securities by banks.\footnote{See Jerry W. Markham & Thomas Lee Hazen, \textit{Broker-Dealer Operations and Regulation Under Securities and Commodities Laws}, \textbf{SECURITIES LAW SERIES} \textbf{23A} \& 13:2 (2d ed. 2014) (describing this jurisdictional fight).} Authority over clearing and settlement of securities was given to the "appropriate" bank regulator.\footnote{\textit{id.}} A sop was thrown to functional regulation by requiring the bank regulators and the SEC to consult with each other in proposing and adopting rules governing clearing and settlement activities.\footnote{15 U.S.C. \textsection 78q-1 (2012).}
Functional regulation was struck another blow by the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, which granted joint jurisdiction to the SEC and CFTC over futures contracts traded on a single stock such as Apple. Legislation previously adopted in 1982 had allocated jurisdiction over derivatives traded on stock and other securities between the SEC based on the questionable functional regulatory claim that the SEC should regulate options on such indexes, while the CFTC would regulate futures and options on futures where the underlying instrument is a security index.

Manipulation of the California energy market in 2000 and 2001 by Enron and other traders resulted in Congress assigning multiple regulators the same anti-manipulation authority that was modeled after the SEC’s principal anti-fraud rule. Those agencies were the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, and the CFTC. Consequently, four regulators (CFTC, SEC, FERC, and FTC), plus the Justice Department, have the same powers for regulating energy price manipulations. Not surprisingly there were quickly jurisdictional battles over which agency’s powers trumped the others.

The Dodd-Frank Act introduced another significant departure from functional regulation. It required most swaps to be centrally cleared and allocated jurisdiction over those previously unregulated swaps between the SEC and CFTC. The SEC was given jurisdiction over security-based swaps, the CFTC was granted jurisdiction over commodity-based swaps, and joint regulatory authority was given to both agencies for “mixed” swaps, i.e., swaps having elements of both securities and commodities.

Jurisdiction over the limited range of permitted uncleared commodity swaps was allocated between the CFTC and the appropriate banking regulatory agency where a bank is engaged in the swap transaction. Dodd-Frank allowed the Secretary of the Treasury to exempt foreign exchange swaps from

290. Markham, supra note 10, at 852.
291. Hunter v. FERC, 711 F.3d 155, 156-57 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (describing one such fight).
293. Id. at A-17.
294. Id. at A-18.
the definition of "swap" for most regulatory purposes, including margin and central clearing requirements.\textsuperscript{295} The Treasury Secretary announced that he had made the determination to make that exemption on November 20, 2012.\textsuperscript{296}

In still another move away from functional regulation, Dodd-Frank created a new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), which acts as an autonomous unit in the Fed.\textsuperscript{297} The CFPB is responsible for adopting and enforcing consumer protection regulations.\textsuperscript{298} However, its enforcement and examination responsibilities were limited to the larger banks, while the Fed, the OCC, and the FDIC were given that responsibility for smaller banks, i.e., those with assets of $10 billion.\textsuperscript{299} The result is multiple regulators regulating products for different institutions under the same statutes. Although housed under the umbrella of the Fed's budget, the CFPB is independent of any oversight by the Fed.\textsuperscript{300} This means that there are two regulators in the Fed assigned the same task of enforcement but for different institutions, which completely ignores the theory of functional regulation.\textsuperscript{301}

C. "Twin Peaks" Regulation

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) noted in 2016 that fragmentation and overlap in the regulation of financial services "have created inefficiencies in regulatory processes, inconsistencies in how regulators oversee similar types of institutions, and differences in the levels of protection afforded to consumers."\textsuperscript{302} The rest of the world had elected not to take the haphazard American approach to regulation that involves multiple regulators for the same parties. In England and other countries, financial services regulation has been divided along the lines of prudential and business conduct regulation, the so-

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{296} Determination of Foreign Exchange Swaps and Foreign Exchange Forwards Under the Commodity Exchange Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 69,694 (Nov. 20, 2012).
\item \textsuperscript{297} BERNAKNE, supra note 84, at 463.
\item \textsuperscript{298} See About Us, CFPB, \url{http://www.consumerfinance.gov/the-bureau/} [https://perma.cc/B44T-UQQA] (last visited Nov. 21, 2016) (describing the role of the CFPB).
\item \textsuperscript{299} See BERNAKNE, supra note 84, at 447 (describing this allocation of jurisdiction).
\item \textsuperscript{300} Id. at 463.
\item \textsuperscript{302} GAO, Financial Regulation: Complex and Fragmented Structure Could Be Streamlined to Improve Effectiveness, GAO-16-175 (Mar 28, 2016), \url{http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-16-175} [https://perma.cc/9YGS-MSR4].
\end{itemize}
called "Twin Peaks" approach to regulation. The Bank of England is responsible for the former and the Financial Conduct Authority for the latter in England. In contrast, the multi-regulator and multi-layered structure of the financial regulatory system in the United States is unlike that of England or any other nation.

A Treasury study and report that was completed in 2008 recommended that the U.S. abandon functional regulation in favor of a system of combined regulation that would take a "Three Peaks" approach. The Treasury regulatory reform proposal thus sought the creation of a regulatory system that would have involved (1) a market stability regulator that would set monetary policy and monitor systemic economic regulatory issues; (2) a prudential financial regulator for government insured banks and broker-dealers that would adopt rules for the protection of those industries government insurance funds; and (3) a business conduct regulator that would regulate business conduct across all financial services.

The market stability regulator would have had responsibility for implementing monetary policy and providing liquidity to financial institutions, a role that is filled by the Fed and that would have continued under the Treasury reform proposal. The prudential financial regulator would have been responsible for the regulation of financial institutions that are protected by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in the case of banks, or the Securities Investors Protection Corporation (SIPC) for broker-dealers. This prudential regulation would have included capital adequacy requirements, investment and activity restrictions, and on-site risk management supervision.

The proposed business conduct regulator would regulate business conduct across all types of financial firms. The Treasury recommended the consolidation of the CFTC and SEC as an interim step in creating a single business conduct regulator. Regulated business conduct would have included disclosures required to be made to consumers, business practices, and licensing, where appropriate, of financial services firms.
Unfortunately, the Financial Crisis of 2008 derailed Treasury's reform efforts. Instead, a Treasury white paper urged the CFTC and SEC to consider proposing legislation that would harmonize their regulation or justify any differences.\(^{311}\) "In its June 2009 white paper on financial regulatory reform, Treasury noted that the broad public policy objectives of futures and securities regulation are the same and that many of the differences in the regulation of the markets are no longer justified."\(^{312}\) Thereafter, the CFTC and SEC issued a joint report describing the differences in their regulations and the legislation needed for harmony.\(^{313}\) That report laid the groundwork for harmonization and eventually consolidation, but, as described above, Dodd-Frank continued the process of diverting from functional regulation to a system of multiple regulators regulating the same product.\(^{314}\)

Recommendations for the consolidation of the SEC and CFTC had failed in the past because jurisdiction over those agencies was divided between Congressional agriculture committees for the CFTC and banking and finance committees for the SEC.\(^{315}\) However, that division of oversight responsibility has been an anachronism for decades because financial derivatives now almost completely dominate the futures markets that once were limited to agricultural based futures contracts.\(^{316}\) It simply no longer makes sense to divide congressional jurisdiction on such grounds. Perhaps this barrier could be breached by creating new congressional committees that would be composed of members of both the agricultural and banking and finance committees in the House and Senate.

The futures industry had also previously rejected SEC style inside information and other regulatory theories and, therefore, did not want to fall within the reach of that aggressive agency's enforcement programs.\(^{317}\) However,

\(^{311}\) DEP'T OF THE TREAS., supra note 200, at 50–51.

\(^{312}\) U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-10-410, FINANCIAL REGULATION: CLEARER GOALS AND REPORTING REQUIREMENTS COULD ENHANCE EFFORTS BY CFTC AND SEC TO HARMONIZE THEIR REGULATORY APPROACHES 6 (2010).


\(^{314}\) Id. at 45.

\(^{315}\) See BERNANKE, supra note 84, at 444 (describing that jurisdictional split and its barriers to consolidation of SEC and CFTC).

\(^{316}\) By 1990, financial futures accounted for about 75 percent of the futures business, and the U.S. Treasury bond futures contract was then the most heavily traded futures contract in the world. MARKHAM, supra note 106, at 162.

Dodd-Frank and other legislation have walled off the application of inside information theories to futures trading.\footnote{318}{See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 753, 124 Stat. 1750 (2010).} Moreover, there has been a sea change in the politics of futures regulation. The powerful exchanges in Chicago and New York that once lobbied Congress on behalf of the futures industry have been largely consolidated into two entities, i.e., the CME Group and the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE).\footnote{319}{See CME GROUP, http://www.cmegroup.com [https://perma.cc/S6B4-BAZZ] (last visited Nov. 21, 2016) (describing CME operations); INTERCONTINENTAL EXCHANGE, https://www.intercontinentalexchange.com/index [https://perma.cc/A3ZG-VMF4] (describing ICE’s operations).} Before the consolidation by the CME, the futures exchanges were member owned and largely controlled by their local floor members who fiercely fought against any form of SEC style regulation.\footnote{320}{MARKHAM, supra note 5, at 347.} However, consolidation of the futures exchanges was attended by demutualization and the growth of electronic trading.\footnote{321}{Id. at 347–48.}

Demutualization meant that the CME had a new constituency in the form of public shareholders and that it is now regulated as a public company by the SEC.\footnote{322}{Id. at 347–48.} To be sure, the current CME leadership are from the older era, but they are no longer beholden to floor members. This is because the growth of electronic trading also led to the closure of most trading floors.\footnote{323}{Id. at 7.} This means that the floor members are no longer in a position to maintain control of the exchange. They also lost their power to control the lobbying efforts of the exchange.

The new electronic traders, for the most part, do not favor more regulation, but many of those traders are familiar with the SEC and its regulation and do not have the same fierce opposition to that regulation as once held by floor traders.\footnote{324}{Id.} In that regard, the other large operator of U.S. futures options exchanges, i.e., ICE, which began in 2000, had as its backers several large investment banks, including Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, which have been long accustomed to SEC regulation.\footnote{325}{Id. at 347.} Consequently, the old futures industry exchange culture is fast becoming extinct. Moreover, the CFTC had become a more aggressive agency in policing manipulation and other trading abuses through the Dodd-Frank legislation that gave it the same anti-fraud authority as the SEC, less insider trading prohibitions.\footnote{326}{Id. at 347.} The CFTC was, unlike the SEC,
once friendly to speculators who brought liquidity and more efficient pricing to
the markets.\footnote{\textit{Id.} at 339.} Today, the CFTC is aggressively attacking speculators and is
seeking headline-grabbing cases that have long been the forte of the SEC.\footnote{\textit{Id.} (describing the transformation of the CFTC into a more aggressive regulator).}

In any event, the merger of the SEC and CFTC would create a natural single
business conduct regulator over the U.S. Treasury market. Indeed, as described
above, the two agencies are already largely fulfilling that role, but as separate
agencies. Still, apart from the politics of such a consolidation, there are numer-
ous practical issues to be considered in merging those agencies. For example,
there needs to be strong representation on the consolidated commission from
both the futures and securities industries. Although cultural differences in the
futures and securities markets are fast being obliterated, such representation
would provide additional expertise in futures trading and knowledge of the nu-
ances in their regulation, such as for inside trading. That integration could be
accomplished by requiring at least two members of a five-member commission
to have strong futures industry backgrounds and two with strong securities in-
dustry experience. A third commissioner should be required to have strong
exposure to both industries, which is not that unusual today since, as noted, the
two markets have gradually become intertwined with each other.

Another issue is staffing for the merger of the CFTC and SEC. It is unlikely
that a merger would result in much of a reduction in enforcement staff because
the combined mission is no less than for the existing division of labor. How-
ever, some reduction could be effected in the commissioners’ offices because
their number and staff would be cut in half in a combined agency. Similarly,
savings could be achieved by eliminating duplicate human resources, govern-
mental affairs, information technology, the Secretariat, and public relations
staff.

The futures and securities industries would also have lessened burdens from
dealing with a single agency instead of the existing two agencies that have often
been at odds with each other over regulation. However, combining the agencies
may have the effect of creating a monolith bureaucracy that may be even more
costly in the form of additional regulations that one or the other of the agencies
would not have adopted if it were independent. As noted, the SEC became a
zealous regulator beginning in the 1960s, and the CFTC has recently adopted a
similar stance.\footnote{ROBERTA S. KARMEL, \textit{REGULATION BY PROSECUTION: THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION VS. CORPORATE AMERICA} 193 (1982).} In that regard, the SEC has long been accused of overreaching
by seeking to create new regulations through novel litigation claims.\textsuperscript{330}

The SEC has also recently sought to tilt the table in its favor by bringing cases before its own administrative law judges (ALJs) where its success rate is substantially higher than for the cases it brings in federal court.\textsuperscript{331} These administrative proceedings may be likened to “kangaroo courts” because the CFTC and SEC and their employees are the judge, who is also the jury, and the prosecutor from the agencies’ enforcement divisions.\textsuperscript{332} The ALJs have their offices in the SEC building and have been admonished by the SEC’s chief ALJ to be loyal to the agency by ruling in favor of the SEC.\textsuperscript{333} As one federal judge also noted, “[t]he SEC appoints the judges, the SEC pays the judges, they are subject to appeal to the SEC . . . .”\textsuperscript{334}

The one-sided nature of these proceedings is exemplified by the fact that the SEC’s success rate in administrative proceedings is substantially higher than the case for actions it brings in federal court (ninety percent in ALJ administrative decisions versus sixty-nine percent in federal court during one recent five-year period).\textsuperscript{335} The situation worsens when a respondent appeals from an adverse decision from an ALJ to the SEC. During the same five-year period, the SEC upheld its ALJs decisions ninety-five percent of the time and often increased penalties over those imposed by the ALJ, which of course discourages appeal.\textsuperscript{336}

Judicial review of SEC/CFTC administrative decisions is also quite limited. Presently, the standard for judicial review is that the CFTC and SEC administrative decisions need only be supported by the “weight” or “preponderance” of the evidence.\textsuperscript{337} This is equated to proof that it is more likely than not that

\textsuperscript{330} See, e.g., id. at ch. 6.

\textsuperscript{331} Several challenges have been mounted recently contending that the SEC’s administrative proceedings are unfair and that ALJs are not appointed correctly as required by the Constitution. Rob Tricchinelli, Jurisdiction and Procedure: More Circuit Court Action on SEC’s In-House Forum, 47 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1942 (2015).


\textsuperscript{333} Several challenges have been mounted recently contending that the SEC’s administrative proceedings are unfair and that ALJs are not appointed correctly as required by the Constitution. Id.

\textsuperscript{334} Id.

\textsuperscript{335} See, e.g., id. Indeed, one SEC ALJ hearing numerous cases over a four-year period had never ruled fully in favor of a respondent. Id.

\textsuperscript{336} Id.

\textsuperscript{337} See, e.g., Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 1008 (1981) (adopting a preponderance test and rejecting clear and convincing evidence standard); Reddy v. CFTC, 191 F.3d 109, 117 (2d Cir. 1999) (“our role in reviewing the Commission finding of preponderance is narrow.”).
the defendant committed a violation. This is a far lower standard than the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt required to be shown in criminal cases.

The penalties imposed in SEC and CFTC administrative proceedings do not include imprisonment, but civil sanctions can be substantial. Such sanctions include large fines, bars from the securities industry or futures trading, and revocation of licenses needed to do business in either industry. The severity of those sanctions should demand a higher level of proof than civil actions seeking recovery of damages that apply the more likely than not standard. Since these sanctions are penalties, not damages, it would seem appropriate to impose the criminal standard of beyond a reasonable doubt.

Alternatively, a standard in between the existing preponderance standard and the criminal standard is that of clear and convincing evidence. That is, the government would be required to offer proof that a fact finder would find was clear and convincing evidence that a defendant committed a violation. In order to achieve acceptance, a single business regulator should be held to such a higher standard of proof in bringing actions that can ruin careers, even if not ultimately successful, because of the adverse publicity generated on filing.

SEC and CFTC administrative proceedings are also marked by the fact that discovery is more limited than is available in proceedings in federal court, and there is no ability to demand a jury trial in administrative proceedings. Those

338. As the SEC website notes:

Depending on the statutory basis for the proceeding, an administrative law judge may order sanctions. Such sanctions include cease-and-desist orders; investment company and officer-and-director bars; censures, suspensions, limitations on activities, or bars from the securities industry or participation in an offering of penny stock; censures or denials of the privilege of appearing or practicing before the Commission; disgorgement of ill-gotten gains; civil penalties; and suspension or revocation of an issuer's registered securities, as well as the registration of a broker, dealer, investment company, investment adviser, municipal securities dealer, municipal advisor, transfer agent, or nationally recognized statistical rating organization. An administrative law judge may also order that a fair fund be established for the benefit of persons harmed by a respondent's violations.


limitations should be corrected.\textsuperscript{342} In addition, the SEC/CFTC commissioners approve of the filing of the administrative complaint before it is filed.\textsuperscript{343} This means that the agency has decided that the conduct in question is a violation, and ALJs are not allowed to make an independent judgment as to whether the administrative complaint actually sets forth a cognizable claim.\textsuperscript{344} That limitation varies dramatically from the commonly used motion to dismiss that is available in federal court.\textsuperscript{345}

As noted, if successful, the government will seek and impose enormous fines and trading restrictions against respondents in administrative proceedings.\textsuperscript{346} There should also be consequences when the government fails to prove these administrative cases, especially in view of the one-sided nature of these proceedings. In fairness, successful respondents should have their attorney fees and expenses reimbursed by the government. In that regard, the existing Equal Access to Justice Act sets too high a bar for attorney fee reimbursement since it requires the defendant to show that the government’s action was not substantially justified.\textsuperscript{347} That standard should be modified to awarding fees when the respondent substantially prevails in an SEC/CFTC administrative proceeding. Additionally, a defendant that prevails in action brought by the business conduct regulator should be given damages for lost wages, reputational losses, and compensation for the disruption of their lives. If these changes cannot be made, then the present one-sided administrative proceedings should be barred except in cases of consent judgments.

\textbf{D. Prudential Regulation}

The second prong for reforming regulation of the U.S. Treasury market is assigning prudential regulation to a single regulator. As described above, the SEC/CFTC are not effective in creating or administering such regulation and

\textsuperscript{342} The SEC has proposed changes to its rules that would allow depositions of witnesses and expert witness testimony, but would place limitations on the timing of such discovery that do not exist in federal court proceedings. \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{343} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{344} See, e.g., \textit{In re Siegel Trading Co.}, CFTC No. 77-1, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 20, 637 (June 21, 1978).

\textsuperscript{345} See \textit{FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6)}.


have little interest in doing so, preferring their business conduct role instead. consequently, a separate, more-qualified prudential regulator is needed for the U.S. Treasury market. the Fed should continue to set monetary policy, but a prudential regulator is needed to resolve dealers when they become insolvent, and such a regulator should create, and examine compliance with, capital and custody requirements for Treasury dealers.

The prudential financial regulator presently responsible for resolving insolvent banks is the FDIC. It operates outside the normal bankruptcy process for commercial corporations. The FDIC is authorized to seize control of institutions it insures when they are insolvent, to sell the institution or its assets and to then pay off depositors for any shortfalls in amounts up to the statutory insurance limit. This process happens very quickly, often resulting in the bank carrying on its operations under a new owner with little or no delay in depositor access to their funds.

SIPC is responsible for regulated broker-dealers that become insolvent. Those liquidations are carried out under the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970. The SIPC trustee will transfer customer funds and securities to solvent broker-dealers and then pay customers for any shortfalls up to the insurance limit. In contrast, customer accounts of insolvent FCMs that fall within the regulatory purview of the CFTC are not protected by government account insurance. Nevertheless, the bankruptcy code and CFTC rules have special rules that govern the bankruptcy of a FCM. Those bankruptcies are carried out much in the manner of the bankruptcy of a commercial firm, except that special provisions are made for the priority of customer claims and the transfer

348. See generally GAO, supra note 302.
350. Id. at 7.
351. Id. at 16.
352. Id. at 13.
356. Efforts to create such an insurance program have failed in the past. See Markham, supra note 215, at 127–29 (describing those efforts).
of customer positions and assets to solvent FCMs.\textsuperscript{358}

The prudential financial regulator would presumably replace the SECs present net capital rule with its own capital requirements.\textsuperscript{359} This would create an anomaly with the CFTC, which has its own net capital rule.\textsuperscript{360} As noted, CFTC regulated FCMs are not covered by account insurance.\textsuperscript{361} Even so, the prudential regulator could be assigned the task of implementing capital requirements for futures commission merchants (FCMs), which are the equivalent of the broker-dealers that are regulated by the SEC and have a capital rule similar to the one imposed by the CFTC on FCMs.\textsuperscript{362}

A problem to be faced is what responsibility the prudential regulator will have over implicit government guarantees. For example, money market funds were guaranteed against loss during the Financial Crisis in 2008.\textsuperscript{363} The Exchange Stabilization Fund that was created during the Great Depression in the 1930s as a means to stabilize the dollar against other currencies was used in 2008 to stop a panic by investors in money market funds after one of those funds experienced losses from Lehman Brothers commercial paper after it failed.\textsuperscript{364} Another implicit guarantee was found in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac mortgage-backed securities that became explicit after the government seized control of those entities during the Financial Crisis in 2008.\textsuperscript{365} If privatized again in the future, then the implicit guarantee concern will arise again.

The Dodd-Frank Act sought to eliminate any implicit guarantee of "too-big-to-fail" financial institutions like AIG through the creation of FSOC.\textsuperscript{366} That super regulatory body designates systemically important financial institutions, subjects them to oversight by the Fed, and requires them to have a "living will" for their orderly liquidation in the event of bankruptcy.\textsuperscript{367} However, this new system is untried and the prudential regulator would need to be given a large role in that process.

Still another area of concern is custody requirements for customer funds

\textsuperscript{359} 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1.
\textsuperscript{360} 17 C.F.R. § 1.17.
\textsuperscript{361} Id.
\textsuperscript{362} See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(a)(1)(iii).
\textsuperscript{363} See BERNANKE, supra note 84, at 250, 301–02.
\textsuperscript{364} Id. at 301–02.
\textsuperscript{365} Id. at 206–07.
\textsuperscript{366} Id. at 462.
\textsuperscript{367} Id.
and securities. Presently there are separate regimes for such requirements imposed by bank regulators, the SEC and CFTC.\textsuperscript{368} The issue here is where should such authority be centralized, i.e., in the prudential financial regulator or in the business conduct regulator? It would seem that the former might be best suited for task since capital requirements go hand-in-hand with custodial requirements in that both seek to assure that the financial institution can meet customer demands for cash.\textsuperscript{369} Custodial requirements seek to protect customer funds from the claims of other creditors, while capital requirements seek to assure that the financial institution has the requisite liquidity to meet customer demands.\textsuperscript{370}

V. CONCLUSION

Functional regulatory theory needs to be abandoned in favor of a consolidated business conduct regulator over the Treasury market. This would be a meaningful step toward the creation of a more streamlined and efficient regulatory system that would be administered by a single business conduct regulator tasked with monitoring and policing abuses in critical markets.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{368} See Markham, supra note 215 (describing those regulatory schemes).
\item \textsuperscript{369} See 23 JERRY W. MARKHAM, BROKER-DEALER OPERATIONS UNDER SECURITIES AND COMMODITIES LAWS, Ch. 4-5 (2015 ed.).
\item \textsuperscript{370} See id. (describing SEC and CFTC custodial and net capital requirements).
\end{itemize}