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An Overview of the Capital Jury Project for Military Practitioners: Jury Dynamics, Juror Confusion, and Juror Responsibility

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Introduction

What exactly happens in the deliberation room of a capital trial? What are the jurors thinking and how are they acting as they make their decisions? Do they act rationally and bravely like the holdout juror played by Henry Fonda in 12 Angry Men,1 or do they succumb to group pressure and change their votes without actually changing their minds? Do they understand and follow the military judge’s directions or are they confused about the fundamental rules that govern capital cases? Do they accept responsibility for their votes or shift responsibility to the other actors in the system? In a capital system that requires a unanimous vote at several stages2—and where a holdout juror can stop the death penalty process—it is critically important for capital attorneys to know the answers to these questions.

Because juror deliberations are closed and secret, however, trial advocates have not had much insight into juror dynamics.3 Fortunately, the Capital Jury Project (CJP), a major research effort, has come up with some answers to those questions, and many of these answers are startling. Civilian capital defense counsel have recognized the value of the CJP findings by adopting new strategies based on those findings, particularly in theme development and voir dire. Unfortunately, most military counsel are not familiar with the CJP’s findings or these new strategies and we, as a community, risk falling well below the standard of practice currently found in state and federal death penalty cases.

Military capital attorneys are drawn from a pool of general criminal trial advocates. Most in this pool have no experience in capital litigation4 because very few court-martial are referred with a capital instruction and military attorneys frequently rotate through both locations and legal disciplines.5 While serving as general criminal litigators, these counsel have no pressing need to keep up with this capital litigation developments. Therefore, military counsel who find themselves detailed to a capital case will likely be operating in the world of the Unknown Unknowns, as Donald Rumsfeld would say. Review his famous quote, cleverly adapted by Hart Seely (without changing the order of any words) to a poem titled Unknown:

As we know,
There are known knowns.
There are things we know we know.
We also know
There are known unknowns.
That is to say
We know there are some things
We do not know.
But there are also unknown unknowns,
The ones we don’t know
We don’t know.6

When an attorney can spot the issue and know the answer right away, she is operating in the world of the Known Knowns. When she can spot the issue but still needs to look up the answer, she is operating in the world of Known Unknowns. When she has no idea what the issues are, she is in the world of Unknown Unknowns: she does not even know that she should be looking something up.7 With no previous exposure to capital litigation—and not having peers or supervisors with that experience—a military defense counsel assigned to a capital case may not know that she does not know about admission defenses, the Colorado method of voir dire, or the Federal Death Penalty Resource Counsel.

12 Angry Men (Orion-Nova Productions 1957). The movie was based on the teleplay and play by Reginald Rose, and was remade as a television show in 1997.

2 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, R.C.M. 1004 (2008) [hereinafter MCM].

3 At least two projects have filmed actual jury deliberations. Frontline filmed a jury as it deliberated a case involving jury nullification, Frontline: Inside the Jury Room (PBS television broadcast Apr. 8, 1986) [hereinafter Frontline project], and ABC News filmed five juries as they deliberated five separate cases, including one capital case, In the Jury Room (ABC television broadcast Aug. 10, 2004). The deliberations captured in these videos reflect many of the Capital Jury Project findings. See also HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966) (the first in-depth study of juror dynamics).

4 The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) has noted that “there is no professional death penalty bar in the military services.” United States v. Kreutzer, 61 M.J. 293, 299 n.7 (C.A.A.F. 2006).


7 Recognizing that a defendant or accused, or an attorney, or a panel member or juror are represented by both sexes in capital cases, throughout this article, I will use “he” as the pronoun for the defendant or accused; “she” as the pronoun for the attorney; and “he” as the pronoun for a juror or panel member.

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The main purpose of this article is to shrink somewhat, for the prospective military capital attorney, the world of the capital Unknown Unknowns by providing an overview of certain areas covered by the CJP—capital jury dynamics, juror confusion, and juror responsibility—and by providing an overview of a major litigation technique that has been developed based on those CJP findings, the Colorado method of voir dire. Having moved these topics to the category of Known Unknowns, prospective military capital attorneys can then work to learn these topics.

Yet military attorneys may not find value in the CJP findings if they think that these findings are unique to civilian jurors and would not shed light on how court-martial panel members think and act. That leads to the other purpose of this article: to show that some evidence exists that capital court-martial panels behave consistently with the CJP findings. Military panel members are human beings and have shown that they follow the same patterns of reasoning and behavior that civilian jurors follow. Not all jurors or panel members will follow all of the patterns revealed by the CJP, but many will think and act in ways described by the CJP findings and some will cast votes based on those thoughts—and in a system where a single vote can decide life or death, those votes are critical.

This article will first cover the CJP findings on jury dynamics; will look at how the military’s rules that govern capital cases could impact panel dynamics; and will demonstrate that military panels in three capital courts-martial have behaved consistently with the CJP findings. This article will next cover the CJP findings related to juror confusion and will demonstrate that military panels or military judges in three capital courts-martial have behaved consistently with those findings. Next, this article will discuss the concept of juror responsibility and how this concept may apply in a military context. Finally, this article will discuss a method of voir dire that defense counsel can use in capital cases to address the issues raised by the CJP.

Findings on Juror Dynamics

In the 1950s, Solomon Asch ran a series of experiments sponsored by the U.S. Navy that revealed the dynamic of social conformity, which is essentially the fear of disagreeing with the majority in a public setting. The examiner would bring a subject into a classroom along with seven to nine other people, all of whom were in on the experiment (only the subject was not). As an example, the examiner would give a card to the subject with a line on it, and have the examiner draw upon the statistical data created by the surveys and interviews as well as the narrative accounts given by the jurors. To date, the CJP has conducted interviews with 1198 jurors from 353 capital trials in 14 states. Academics have published the results of these interviews in many journals and books.

What is the Capital Jury Project?

Started in 1991, the CJP is a research project supported by the National Science Foundation and headquartered at the University of Albany’s School of Criminal Justice. The people doing the work are “a consortium of university-based investigators—chiefly criminologists, social psychologists, and law faculty members—utilizing common data-gathering instruments and procedures.”

What is the Capital Jury Project?, STATE UNIV. OF NEW YORK AT ALBANY SCH. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, http://www.albany.edu/scj/CJPwhat.htm (last visited June 7, 2011) [hereinafter What is the CJP?].


11 Id.
12 What is the CJP?, supra note 8.
13 Id. See also Bowers, supra note 9, at 1077–84 (in-depth discussion of the sample design and data collection methods); Blume et al., supra note 10, at 145–48.
14 What is the CJP?, supra note 8.
17 Asch, Effects of Group Pressure, supra note 16, at 178.
along with another card that had three lines on it, as shown below:\textsuperscript{18}

![Image](image.png)

The subject's task was to match the line on the left to either line 1, 2, or 3 on the right. The examiner would then ask one of the other people who was helping with the experiment for the answer and the person would deliberately give an incorrect answer, say, 1. The examiner would ask another person and that person would also give that same incorrect answer, and on down the line until the examiner reached the subject. The examiner would then ask the subject for the answer, which the subject would have to state in front of everyone else.\textsuperscript{19}

The results of the experiment are startling: for each individual question, the subjects would go along with the group and give the wrong answer to this simple question nearly one-third of the time. During the series of multiple questions, one-fourth of the subjects would miss at least one question.\textsuperscript{20} Compare that to when the subjects were alone when they did the task: the subjects would get the right answer on all of the questions 95% of the time.\textsuperscript{21}

The experiments revealed that this force of social conformity primarily arose when three or more people gave the wrong answer first; had some influence when two people gave the wrong answer first; and had little influence when only one gave the wrong answer first.\textsuperscript{22} Further, if just one other person went against the majority, the power of the group pressure was greatly reduced. If that "partner" later changed his answer to the incorrect answer, the power of social conformity returned with full force.\textsuperscript{23} When the subjects did not have to announce their findings in public, the majority effect diminished markedly.\textsuperscript{24}

But can one look to Asch's research to draw conclusions about how jurors and panel members act? The situations are quite different. First, other than public embarrassment, not much was on the line during the Asch experiments. Much more is at stake in a capital trial—someone's life. Next, in Asch's experiments, the subjects were dealing with facts (the length of lines). Capital jurors deal with facts but they also deal with norms and values such as whether someone should live or die. Finally, in the Asch experiments, no requirement existed for the group to return a unanimous group answer—the experiment dealt with a series of individual answers. Capital juries must return a unanimous verdict.

The CJP research shows that the answer to this question is, "Yes." Capital jurors, dealing in norms or values, faced with the requirement to produce a unanimous answer, are affected by group pressure—even when someone's life is on the line. But unlike the Asch findings, adding one partner (having a minority of two) is not enough to overcome that pressure. The minority needs to be at least 25% and probably as high as 33% in order for those jurors to preserve their votes. For example, during the first vote on sentence, if 25% or fewer of the jurors vote for life, those jurors will almost always change their votes and the verdict will be death. If 33% or more vote for life, those jurors will almost always maintain their vote and the verdict will be life. If the vote falls between 25% and 33%, the verdict can go either way.\textsuperscript{25}

Importantly, the research indicates that the minority voters do not actually change their beliefs about whether the defendant should live or die: they just change their votes.\textsuperscript{26} Asch stated that, "A theory of social influences must take into account the pressures upon persons to act contrary to their beliefs and values."\textsuperscript{27} What social pressures and dynamics occur in a deliberation room that can cause someone to vote against his belief when so much is at stake?

One of the first interesting findings is that jurors do not remain open-minded for very long. Even if jurors were not that committed to their position before they cast their first vote, they quickly harden them: "Psychologists have discovered that when groups deliberate and an initial disagreement exists, group members tend not to move toward a 'middle' position, but actually become even more

\textsuperscript{18} Asch, supra note 16, at 452.

\textsuperscript{19} Asch, Effects of Group Pressure, supra note 16, at 178–79.

\textsuperscript{20} Id. at 181–82; Asch, A Minority of One, supra note 16, at 9.


\textsuperscript{22} Id., Effects of Group Pressure, supra note 16, at 188.

\textsuperscript{23} Id. at 186.

\textsuperscript{24} Asch, A Minority of One, supra note 16, at 65.

\textsuperscript{25} Blume et al., supra note 10, at 173. See also Scott Sundby, War and Peace in the Jury Room: How Capital Juries Reach Unanimity, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 103, 110 (2010). Sundby notes that there is a first vote threshold that forecasts the result of the trial in eighty-nine percent of the studies he sampled. With a jury of twelve members, if the first vote has five or more votes for life, the sentence will almost always be life. If the first vote on sentence has nine or more votes for death, the sentence will almost always be death.


\textsuperscript{27} ASCH, supra note 16, at 450–51.
extreme or polarized in the direction of their original leanings.”28 As members of the majority argue their points to the minority, the members of the majority become cemented in their attitudes29 and approach the minority as teachers “trying to lead students to the right answer.”30 The middle ground quickly disappears. Scott Sundby also notes that some juries learned from the guilt-phase voting that once people make a public announcement of their position, it is difficult to move them off that position.31 Based on those guilt-phase experiences, some juries decided to avoid that problem by not taking an initial vote during the penalty phase, thereby trying to preserve some middle ground.32

With jurors now polarized, the majority begins to work on the minority by applying social pressure. Sundby notes that in many of the juries studied, some jurors adopted recurring roles. One of these roles is the victim’s advocate. The victim’s advocate believes that “it is up to them personally to act as the victim’s voice in the jury room”33 and “that ‘they didn’t want to run into the victim’s parents and feel like they didn’t do the right thing by the victim and parents.’”34 Another of these roles is the bully. The bully may resort to sarcasm, belligerence, name calling, and demeaning comments.35 The bully may believe that his role is to serve as the “bad cop”: “He sensed that the others expected him to be brusque, to raise the arguments that they were too polite to make or were not worldly enough to fully comprehend.”36 Sometimes these roles are played by the same juror. Often, in civilian trials, the deliberations will become contentious, loud, and angry,37 and jurors are often reduced to tears.38

As the minority is whittled down to a single holdout,39 the pressure increases. Frustration and anger arise because the majority feels that the holdout can essentially hold the entire group’s decision hostage to his views.40 Members of the majority will challenge the holdout with whether he had been honest in voir dire when asked if he could vote for death (or life, if holding out the other way).41 Jurors will use subtle pressure to get the holdout to change his position like cutting off his questions, talking to him in a patronizing tone, or sighing.42 According to Asch, this withdrawal of social support is a powerful component of group pressure.43

Further, the holdout is under constant pressure from all angles and cannot take any mental breaks:

The worst part was that [the holdout] could not easily opt out of the active deliberations as some other jurors had done. [The holdout] had become the focus of the deliberations, and in some sense every question and every comment was directed at her, asking her to justify how she could still be voting life now that eleven were for the death penalty.44

The members of the majority can take turns. They can daydream or go to the bathroom while someone else takes the lead. The holdout has no relief.

Eventually the holdout changes his vote, not because he now believes in the rightness of the other side’s position or is persuaded by the aggravating evidence, but because he has reached emotional exhaustion and simply acquiesces. Sundby remarks,

[T]he powerful pull of conformity can be observed readily, whether on the playground or in the workplace. And, of course, such pressures come into play in the jury room. For those of us who have whispered to ourselves that we would play Henry Fonda’s role in the jury room, the sobering reality is that many of us would not live up to our hopes and expectations.45

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28 SUNDAY, supra note 15, at 51. Asch describes something similar, where the subject adopts the majority position and the act of adopting the majority position “increases the person’s confidence in his response.” Asch, Effects of Group Pressure, supra note 16, at 182. Further, “[G]roup decisions are generally more extreme than are individual decisions.” Steven J. Sherman, The Capital Jury Project: The Role of Responsibility and How Psychology Can Inform the Law, 70 IND. L.J. 1241, 1246 (1995). Sherman continues, “[D]ifferent individuals may have different reasons for their individual decision. When each person is then exposed to other supporting arguments by the other group members who share their decision outcome, they become even more polarized. Research clearly demonstrates that jury deliberations produce this polarization effect.” id.

29 SUNDAY, supra note 15, at 51–52.

30 Id. at 21.

31 Id. supra note 25, at 112.

32 Id.

33 SUNDAY, supra note 15, at 128.

34 Id. at 129.

35 Id. at 122.

36 Id.

37 Id. at 123.

38 Id. at 56.

39 See also id. at 81–84 (including an interesting discussion of Asch’s experiments related to this process).

40 Id. at 55.

41 Id. at 23.

42 Id. at 66–68.

43 Asch, Effects of Group Pressure, supra note 16, at 188.

44 SUNDAY, supra note 15, at 85.

45 Id. at 84.
Likewise, the jurors who cross-over from a death vote to a life vote often do so to avoid becoming a hung jury and not because they were influenced by mitigating factors. As Asch would predict, the social factors in the courtroom—and not the aggravating or mitigating circumstances—drive the juror to change his vote.

Jury Dynamics and the Military Justice System—in Theory

This section will discuss in theory how panel member dynamics in a capital case might be affected by the force of social conformity. The next section will discuss whether there is any evidence that the dynamics discovered by the CJP actually exist in capital courts-martial. Looking first at voting procedures, like civilian capital trials, capital courts-martial require unanimous votes: before a death sentence may be imposed, a panel must have a unanimous finding of guilt on a capital offense; a unanimous vote on the existence of an aggravating factor; a unanimous vote that extenuating and mitigating circumstances are substantially outweighed by the aggravating circumstances, and a unanimous vote that death is the appropriate sentence. The basic framework is the same as that found in civilian systems, so maybe members faced with resolving the difficult issue placed before them will follow the same patterns as civilian jurors.

However, the Rules for Courts-Martial (RCM) include provisions not found in civilian systems that should prevent the force of social conformity from coming into play at three of the four voting junctures—all but the final vote on life or death. One of most important of these rules deals with how the panel votes and re-votes on the question of guilt as to the capital offense. For death to be an available punishment in the presentencing proceeding, a panel of at least twelve members must vote unanimously that the accused is guilty of the capital offense. After the members deliberate on the capital offense, the members vote by secret written ballot. The junior member collects and counts the ballots, the president announces the result, and that result is the finding.

If the vote on the capital offense is two-thirds or greater for guilt, the finding on that offense is guilty; however, if the vote on the capital offense is not unanimous, then the accused cannot face the death penalty. He is still guilty of the offense, he is just not eligible for the death penalty. Importantly, the rules prohibit the panel from re-voting on that finding of guilt for the purpose of increasing the votes to a unanimous vote, thereby making the accused death-eligible. The finding can only be reconsidered under the procedure outlined in Article 52 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and RCM 924, and those rules do not allow for a non-unanimous vote for guilt to be reconsidered.

This means an 11-1 vote for guilt is a finding and cannot be revisited in an effort to get a unanimous vote on a capital offense. The rules themselves preserve the minority: the majority never gets a chance to apply pressure on the minority members to change their votes to guilty. A single panel member can anonymously remove the death penalty as an available sentence by voting for a lesser-included offense of the capital offense without subsequently having to explain himself to the group.

Turning to the capital presentencing proceeding, some of the rules also protect the minority. There are three potential votes in the capital sentencing deliberations: a vote on whether an aggravating factor exists; if all panel members agree that at least one does, then a vote on whether the extenuating and mitigating factors are substantially outweighed by the aggravating circumstances (the balancing test); if all panel members vote yes, then they vote on the ultimate sentence, which could include death. As with the

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46 Sandys, supra note 26, at 1207. Sundby describes how the process of converting death votes to life votes is very similar. Sundby, supra note 25, at 140–44. The jury filmed for the project displays many of these dynamics. Frontline project, supra note 3. Interestingly, the holdout is arguing for a conviction where the law clearly requires a conviction (the case is about jury nullification). The force of social conformity works against him and he eventually joins the vote for acquittal—not because he believed the defendant was not guilty, but because he did not want to prevent the others from reaching their decision.

47 After reviewing CJP data, Sundby concluded that capital juries followed remarkably similar patterns as they reached a decision on the sentence. Sundby, supra note 25, at 105–06. Jurors would follow a five-step process: first, the majority would unite with a strong viewpoint; second, the majority would isolate and focus on the holdouts to get them to change their votes; third, the majority would convert the holdouts to the majority position; fourth, the majority would reconcile with and support the former holdouts until the verdict was announced; and fifth, the jurors would wait in suspense as the jurors were individually polled during the announcement of the sentence, wondering if a holdout would change positions at the last minute. Id. at 105–06, 146–48.

48 Id. at 105–06, 146–48. MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 1004(a)(2).

49 Id. at 105–06, 146–48. MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 1004(b)(4)(B).

50 Id. at 105–06, 146–48. MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 1004(b)(4)(C).

51 Id. at 105–06, 146–48. MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 1004(b)(4)(A).

52 Id. R.C.M. 1004(a)(2).

53 Id. R.C.M. 921(c)(1).

54 Id. R.C.M. 921(c)(5).

55 UCMJ art. 52(a)(2) (2008).

56 MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 924(b) & discussion.

57 UCMJ art. 52(c); MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 924(b); R.C.M. 922(b)(2); R.C.M. 922 analysis, at A21-50.

58 MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 1004(b)(7).

59 Id. R.C.M. 1004(b)(4)(C).

60 Id. R.C.M. 1004(b)(5).
merits voting, the votes are also by secret, written ballot, and the junior member collects and counts the ballots while the president announces the result. 

For the first two votes (the vote on the aggravating factor and the vote on the balancing test) the first vote is the finding, just like the vote on guilt after the merits deliberations is a finding. The votes on these first two gates may not be reconsidered because there are no reconsideration procedures for these votes. Like the vote on guilt for the capital offense, if a single member anonymously votes that no aggravating factor exists or that the extenuating and mitigating factors are not substantially outweighed by the aggravating circumstances, then the deliberations on those gates are over and those votes cannot be revisited.

For these three findings votes (the guilt finding on the capital offense, the aggravating factors finding, and the balancing test finding), defense counsel should be wary of "straw votes." Straw votes are informal votes taken by members to see where they stand on the issues. They are not authorized by the RCMs or the UCMJ but are not specifically prohibited by these sources. However, the Court of Military Review has said that "we do not believe that this practice merits encouragement," primarily because straw polls circumvent the voting reconsideration rules, remove anonymity, and allow superiority of rank considerations to enter the deliberation room. Having seen that the established voting rules prevent the force of social conformity from affecting these first three findings votes, defense counsel should recognize the danger posed by straw votes, should object to any request that straw votes be allowed, should ask the military judge to instruct that no straw votes may be taken, and should educate panel members during voir dire to prevent straw votes.

Turning to the final vote on the sentence, the rules no longer protect the minority to the same degree. Members propose sentences in writing and submit them to the junior member who in turn provides them to the president who announces them in the deliberation room. The members then vote and revote on the sentences, starting with the least severe sentence, and continuing with the next least severe until enough votes exist for a sentence. The vote requirements are a three-fourths majority for life (which is the mandatory minimum for premeditated murder and felony murder), three-fourths for life without parole (LWOP), and unanimous for death.

The panel continues to vote and revote until one of two things happens. If enough panel members have voted for a particular sentence, then the sentence has been adopted. (Unlike the merits vote and the first two votes during the sentencing deliberations, this decision is not a "finding.") Or, the panel can hang. In the court-martial system, panels cannot hang on the merits—if there are not enough votes for a guilty finding when the ballot count is announced, then the accused is acquitted. However, panels can hang on the sentencing decision. If the panel cannot agree on a sentence, the military judge will declare a mistrial on the sentence only (the merits findings still stand), and the case is returned to the convening authority to either order a rehearing on the sentence only or order that no punishment be imposed.

Unlike the first three votes, where the rules prohibit re-voting and so shield against the force of social conformity, here the rules allow that force to enter the deliberation room because re-voting is explicitly allowed. One should expect the force of social conformity to play a major role in deliberations—the majority will get the chance to work on the minority as the panel struggles to reach either a three-fourths vote for life or LWOP, or a unanimous vote for death. Even though the votes are still by secret, written ballot, everyone will be able to recognize who the holdout

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61 Id. R.C.M. 1004(b)(7), 1006(d)(2). The rules expressly call for a secret, written vote on the aggravating factors gate but do not expressly call for a secret, written vote on the balancing gate. However, the CAAF advises military judges to require that this vote be reduced to writing. United States v. Curtis, 44 M.J. 106, 159 (C.A.A.F. 1996). Complying with that advisory, Army judges provide an instruction that calls for a secret, written vote on the balancing decision. U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, PAM. 27-9, MILITARY JUDGES’ BENCHBOOK para. 8-3-40 (1 Jan. 2010) [hereinafter MILITARY JUDGES’ BENCHBOOK].

62 MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 1006(d)(3).

63 Id. R.C.M. 1004(b)(4).

64 Id. R.C.M. 1004(b)(4)(C) & (b)(7); R.C.M. 1006.


66 Id.

67 Id. In Lawson, the panel asked the military judge whether they could conduct straw votes on the findings (not on the sentence, where the rules allow for revoting without using reconsideration rules), and the military judge said they could. Id. at 40. Importantly, the defense counsel did not object. Id. The Court of Military Review indicated that this procedure would not be allowed over defense objection. Id. at 41.

68 MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 1006(e).

69 Id. R.C.M. 1006(d)(3)(A). In a note to the hung jury instruction, the Military Judges’ Benchbook states that, “In capital cases, only one vote on the death penalty may be taken.” MILITARY JUDGES’ BENCHBOOK, supra note 61, para. 2-7-18. However, that note is not supported by the rules or case law.

70 UCMJ art. 52(b)(2) (2008).

71 Id. art. 118(4).

72 Id. art. 52(b)(2).

73 Id. art. 52(b)(1).

74 MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 1006(d)(6).

75 Id. R.C.M. 1006(e); MILITARY JUDGES’ BENCHBOOK, supra note 61, para. 2-7-18.

76 MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 1006(e).

77 Id. R.C.M. 1006(d)(2).
is because he is the one making the arguments for life. Further, the president of the panel can keep the deliberations open until he or she feels that the debate is done, which could mean keeping the deliberations open until the holdout comes around.

While the primary rules for voting on a sentence allow the force of social conformity to enter the deliberation room, two ancillary rules could be used to counter that force. The first rule is the hung jury instruction from the U.S. Army’s Military Judges’ Benchbook, which explains to the panel members that they do not have to agree:

[Y]ou each have the right to conscientiously disagree. It is not mandatory that the required fraction of members agree on a sentence and therefore you must not sacrifice conscientious opinions for the sake of agreeing upon a sentence. Accordingly, opinions may properly be changed by full and free discussion during your deliberations. You should pay proper respect to each other’s opinions, and with an open mind you should conscientiously compare your views with the views of others.

[Y]ou are not to yield your judgment simply because you may be outnumbered or outweighed.

If, after comparing views and repeated voting for a reasonable period in accordance with these instructions, your differences are found to be irreconcilable, you should open the court and the president may then announce, in lieu of a formal sentence, that the required fraction of members are unable to agree upon a sentence.

This language explains to the holdout in a public setting that he does not have to move from a conscientious decision (that is, a moral decision based on an inner sense of right and wrong) simply because he is outnumbered. His only obligation is to deliberate for a reasonable period of time.

The problem for the defense counsel is getting the military judge to read this instruction to the panel. The directions in the instruction state that it should be read “[w]henever any question arises concerning whether the required concurrence of members on a sentence or other matter relating to sentence is mandatory” or if the panel “has been deliberating for an inordinate length of time.” If, after deliberating, the panel asks the military judge a question about the effect of a non-unanimous vote on the death penalty, or if the panel has been deliberating for a long time, the defense counsel should ask the military judge to read this instruction. And, the defense counsel should work this instruction into her voir dire of the panel.

If the panel adopts a sentence, another rule exists which could work to counter the force of social conformity—the reconsideration provisions for adopted sentences outlined in RCM 1009. To reconsider an adopted sentence of death with an eye toward lowering the sentence to life, only one member needs to vote to reconsider. While this procedure only applies to sentences that have been adopted (which means that the holdout member has already given up, at least temporarily) and not to the votes taken as the panel tries to reach an adopted sentence, it does serve as a final opportunity for a holdout member to return to his original vote. The rules require that the panel go to the judge for additional instructions before they can reconsider the sentence. This provides the opportunity for the military judge to read the hung jury instruction, which then might work against the force of social conformity and enable the holdout member to preserve his vote. After asking for reconsideration, the panel member would be instructed that the law does not expect him to change a firmly held moral belief—he only needs to negotiate with an open mind for a reasonable amount of time.

This discussion of the voting rules suggests that defense counsel should focus on those decision points that have rules that protect against the force of social conformity. Defense counsel should refine their merits arguments to focus the panel on lesser-included offenses. Defense counsel can use “admission defenses” to present a credible argument that

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81 Id.
82 Id.
83 MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 1009.
84 Id. R.C.M. 1009(e)(3)(B). To reconsider the sentence with a view toward increasing the sentence from life to death requires a majority vote. Id. R.C.M. 1009(e)(3)(A). That would require a significant number of life voters to change to death voters and is unlikely to happen. See Sundby, supra note 25, at 108-09.
85 MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 1009(e)(1).
the accused is not guilty of the greater capital offense. In their sentencing arguments, defense counsel should specifically address the aggravating factors and the balancing test. Defense counsel will often have to find novel approaches to the aggravating factors since the aggravating factors are often not in controversy, especially when there are two or more murder victims. However, the balancing test vote (that any extenuating or mitigating circumstances are substantially outweighed by any aggravating circumstances) is always in controversy. If the defense counsel properly educates the members in voir dire and the military judge clearly instructs the members on the voting rules for the balancing test vote, a potential holdout juror will recognize that he can anonymously end the debate on life versus death by voting against death at the balancing test vote.

Turning now to bullies in the deliberation room, we should not expect to find overt bullies in a court-martial deliberation room, but a dynamic that resembles that pressure exists: the dynamic of rank in the deliberation room. Overt use of rank within the deliberation room is a form of unlawful command influence and is impermissible. Panel members understand that. Senior-ranking members do not look at the junior-ranking members and tell them, “You will vote this way.” The real problem is subtle or even unintended influence. During deliberations, members will learn where other members stand on the issues; therefore, even though the voting is secret, the junior member will generally know where the senior member stands and vice versa. The Court of Military Review said as much in United States v. Lawson:

[W]e cannot deny that considerations of rank may have, at least, an unconscious effect upon the deliberations of a court-martial. Typically there will be some discussion among court members as to the facts of the case, and it is hard to imagine how, in speaking about the facts, a member could completely conceal his views.

. . .

Obviously, if [verbal “straw polls” were taken], the danger would be enhanced, because each member’s position—albeit, a tentative position—is clearly revealed to the others; and junior members might be influenced to conform to the expressed positions of their seniors.91

If the panel follows the correct voting procedures and does not cast any straw votes, this dynamic should not be much of an issue during the first three votes. The junior member can anonymously cast a vote and end the discussion.

However, this dynamic may play a significant role in the final vote for life or death. While one should not expect that anyone on a panel will resort to name-calling or other bully tactics, the respect given to rank might achieve the same result. A junior panel member who is holding out for life may change his vote when eleven other senior members in the military, including a president who is most likely a colonel, are telling him, albeit politely or through stares, that a life vote is inappropriate. And, the president of the panel can exercise his discretion to keep the deliberations open until he feels that the debate is done, which a president could do until he feels that the holdout vote has come around.

A look at the RCMs, then, shows that the potential for the force of social conformity exists in a military panel’s deliberation room. On the final vote for life or death, the panel must continue to re-vote until they reach a sentence or hang. One of the dynamics that causes a minority voter to change his vote in a civilian jury—a bully in the deliberation room—probably does not exist in that form in a military panel room but may have a close counterpart: the influence of rank in the deliberation room. The next step is to see if any evidence exists that these dynamics have surfaced in a capital court-martial.

Evidence of These Dynamics in Capital Courts-Martial

At least three capital courts-martial appear to reflect some of the CJP findings. A review of the appellate opinions of the modern capital courts-martial that have resulted in approved death sentences reveals two cases in which, at some point in deliberations, at least one panel member voted for life. In addition, news reports of a recent capital court-martial indicate that at least one panel member voted for life before changing his or her vote to death. Two of these cases may have also been impacted by the influence of rank in the deliberation room.

One of the important CJP findings is that most juries start deliberations with at least some jurors who support a

91 Id. at 40–41.

92 MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 502(b)(1); R.C.M. 1006, Accordino, 20 M.J. at 105.

life sentence. As discussed earlier, though, if the minority vote is 25% or fewer, those jurors will almost always change their minds. In United States v. Loving, possibly the most recognized capital case in the military, the initial vote on a proposed sentence was seven votes for death and one for life. The panel re-voted the sentence after further deliberations and, as the CJP findings would predict, that one voter (12%) changed his vote to death.

The influence of rank in the panel room may have also played a role in Loving. The Loving opinion contains three affidavits from panel members, allowing a rare (though short) glimpse into the deliberation room of a capital court-martial. Again, the initial vote on the sentence in Loving was seven votes for death and one for life. In this case, under the president’s guidance, the panel did not vote on aggravating factors; did not vote on the balancing gate; did not nominate sentences (the president, a colonel, told them that they needed to vote between two options, life and death); the junior member did not count the votes, but passed them to the president to count instead; and the panel did not vote on the lightest sentence first.

After discussing that these rules exist to prevent rank from entering the deliberation room, in the dissenting opinion, Judge Wiss stated:

Regrettably, the specter [of unlawful command influence] has been raised that this carefully designed structure of procedures broke down in this case—and critically, that it did so entirely because the superior-ranking member of the court unilaterally imposed his own short-cut toward a sentence rather than follow the clear path carefully mapped out [by the rules].

Judge Wiss concluded:

It is not within [the president’s] authority or discretion . . . to divine his own personally preferred procedural path toward a death sentence, . . .

Unlawful command influence? I think so. . . . [These affidavits] portray a scenario in which the senior-ranking member, solely by the virtue of his rank, successfully imposed a procedure that was unlawful.

In the context of the earlier discussion on juror dynamics, the panel president’s explanation of what happened takes on new meaning. Here is what he said:

The judge had explained before we adjourned that the death penalty required a unanimous vote. . . . After another 1 1/2 hours of review, I asked if everyone was prepared to vote again. They said they were . . . . The second vote resulted in the following: 8 votes [for death].

The language the president used is important, particularly when viewed from the perspective of whoever was Panel Member #8 in this case. Panel Member #8 knows that he voted for life and is the only life vote, so the president of the panel—the colonel who just made that statement—necessarily voted for death. The colonel has just said that in order to impose the death penalty, everybody needs to vote for death. He did not say, “Or three-fourths of us can vote for life, or we can be a hung jury, all three of which are acceptable options.” The implied message to the holdout is,

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95 Blume et al., supra note 10, at 173.
96 Id. at 234–35. Prior to the passage of Article 52a, UCMJ, in 2001, which requires twelve members in a capital court martial, capital courts-martial only require the same number of panel members that are required in any general court-martial—five. UCMJ arts. 16(a)(A), 52a (2008).
97 The dissenting opinion in Loving contains all three affidavits in their entirety. Loving, 41 M.J. at 331–33 (Wiss, J., dissenting).
98 Id. at 234–35.
99 Id. at 313 (Wiss, J., dissenting).
100 Id. at 313–14 (Wiss, J., dissenting).
101 Id. at 313–14 (Wiss, J., dissenting).
102 Id. at 313 (Wiss, J., dissenting). In theory, a case could be capital-eligible going into the sentencing deliberations but then no panel member would nominate death as a sentence. All of the panel members might nominate life or life without parole (LWOP). In that case, the panel would not be able to deliberate on death.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 313–14 (Wiss, J., dissenting).
105 Id. at 313 (Wiss, J., dissenting).
106 Id. at 314 (Wiss, J., dissenting). Judge Wiss contrasts the president’s ability and power to modify the procedures with the inability of a second lieutenant on a panel to do the same thing. Id. at 314–15 n.1 (Wiss, J., dissenting):
Can it be more than rhetorical to ask whether anyone except the most senior ranking person on the court could have unilaterally imposed on all of the other, presumably intelligent, officer members a procedure of his own handwritten that was in marked deviation from that which clearly and in detail was prescribed by the military judge? I am not so naive as to believe that a second lieutenant . . . could have been so possessed of nature leadership that he so effectively could have led astray a whole panel of his colleagues.
107 Id. at 331–33 (Wiss, J., dissenting). His account was confirmed by two junior members on the panel who also provided affidavits. Id. Sundby documents very similar language which was used against a holdout. SUNDBY, supra note 15, at 90.
"You need to change your vote." Panel Member #8 is the one during deliberations who mentioned that life might be appropriate, so everyone on that panel, including Panel Member #8, must have know, that the colonel was speaking to Panel Member #8.

In Loving, Panel Member #8 changed his vote—possibly because of the social conformity dynamic and because of the subtle pressure of rank in the deliberation room. Even if the panel member genuinely changed his mind (and not just his vote) based on the deliberations, the key is to recognize that there is real potential for these dynamics to exist.

The capital case of United States v. Thomas (Thomas Jr.) also contains portions of post-trial depositions given by panel members. These depositions indicate that multiple votes were taken on the finding of guilt with at least some votes for acquittal on the capital offense. This was contrary to the RCMs, which, as discussed above, do not allow for re-voting on the findings for the purpose of seeking a unanimous vote on the capital offense. After receiving instructions on the findings from the military judge, the panel president asked how many times the panel could vote on the verdict before they announced their findings. The military judge essentially told him that if that issue came up, to come back to the military judge. Based on that question, the defense counsel asked the military judge to ask the panel how many times they voted on the finding but the military judge denied that request.

After the trial, the appellate defense counsel called the junior member of the panel who told him (and another appellate defense counsel) that the panel voted multiple times on the finding of guilt. The appellate defense counsel provided affidavits to the Navy-Marine Court of Military Review, which then ordered depositions of the panel members. Of these nine panel members, three said that the initial vote on guilt included votes for not guilty with probably two panel members voting for not guilty. Five said that only one vote was taken on the guilty finding (including the president, and, interestingly, the junior panel member that the appellate defense counsel had interviewed earlier). One had retired and refused to answer questions.

The difference in the way the panel members remember the voting process is interesting. Very likely, the two panel members who voted not guilty are among the three that remember the multiple votes. They would have been the ones that the group dynamics worked against and would have felt a high degree of stress, resulting in a memorable event. By this reasoning, the president of the panel was very likely in the majority block that was voting for guilt. He remembered only one vote. This president, like the president in Loving, did not follow the rules and may have unintentionally invited the subtle pressure of rank into the deliberation room. Had the president followed the rules, no further deliberations would have been allowed on the merits. The accused would not have received a death sentence. Instead, the minority voters changed their positions (at only 22%, this result conforms to the CJF findings), possibly because of the force of social conformity and the subtle pressure of rank in the deliberation room.

Last, in the recent capital court-martial of Master Sergeant Timothy Hennis, the panel asked a question that indicated that at least one panel member voted for life during the sentencing deliberations. After more than seven hours of debate, the fourteen-member panel asked the military judge, "If one person votes against imposing a death sentence, are subsequent ballots automatically for a life sentence?" The reasonable inference from this is that at least one person in the panel room voted for life, and to his credit, the president of the panel returned to the judge for guidance. The military judge told the panel to follow the rules for voting on a sentence: to keep deliberating and voting until the panel reached sufficient votes to adopt a sentence (three-fourths for life or unanimous for death). The military judge did not, however, read them the hung jury instruction. After another six hours of deliberation, consistent with the CJF findings (the minority was 7%), that voter changed his vote and the panel adopted a sentence of death. Had the military judge read the hung jury instruction, the minority voter may have found assurances in the language and hung on to his vote.

108 The court in Loving resolved the unlawful command influence issue by ruling that the affidavits provided by the panel members were not admissible under the 1984 Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM). Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, MIL. R. EVID. 606(b) (1984) [hereinafter 1984 MCM]. Loving, 41 M.J. at 239. The majority declined to hold that the information included in the affidavits rose to the level of unlawful command influence necessary to satisfy one of the exceptions in Military Rule of Evidence (MRE) 606(b). 1984 MCM, supra, MIL R. EVID. 606(b); Loving, 41 M.J. at 237–38.
110 Id. at 637.
111 Id. at 628.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 629.
These three cases indicate that panel members in capital cases face similar dynamics when deliberating cases that civilian jurors face. In each of these cases, at least one panel member changed a vote that could have prevented the imposition of the death penalty but changed that vote, consistent with the research on jury dynamics. And in two of these cases, the subtle influence of rank in the deliberation room may have substituted for the bullying behavior that is sometimes found in civilian juries.

**Juror Confusion**

Another of the major findings of the CJP is the striking degree to which jurors do not understand the law because the instructions were incomplete, poorly drafted, or otherwise confusing. For example, even after hearing the instructions and sitting through a capital trial, 63% of jurors in one study thought that the law required them to impose the death sentence if they found that the crime was heinous, atrocious, or cruel; 43% thought the same if they found the defendant would pose a future danger; 41% thought the standard of proof on mitigating factors was beyond a reasonable doubt; 42% thought unanimity was required on mitigating factors; only one-third understood that life was the required sentence if the mitigating factors outweighed the aggravating factors; and when given six basic questions about the process to answer, fewer than 50% were able to answer more than half of the questions correctly.

One of the main reasons for this is that instructions are written by trial lawyers for appellate lawyers and not for jurors. Even when provided with the written instructions, jurors find them long, boring, and confusing, "like the undecipherable user's manual that comes with a new computer, written by one technician for another." The instructions may have gaps or confusing portions and the process for seeking clarification from the judge is overwhelming, intimidating, and time consuming. If a juror has a question, the court has to get the lawyers, get the defendant from a holding cell, and formally march everyone into the courtroom. The response from the judge is often to simply re-read the same instruction that the jurors found was confusing. After doing that once, jurors figure out that the process is not worth it and try to solve the problems on their own—often incorrectly.

For those who think that a military panel filled with college-educated professionals will have no problem following the instructions or the law, or that military judges will provide complete, accurate instructions, a review of three military capital cases may challenge that assumption. Look again at Loving. The panel failed to follow many of the military judge's instructions. According to affidavits provided by three panel members, including the president (a colonel), the panel did not vote on the aggravating factors, violating RCM 1004(b)(7). The panel did not vote on whether the aggravating factors substantially outweighed the extenuating and mitigating factors, violating RCM 1004(b)(4)(B). The panel did not vote in order of least severe sentence to most severe sentence, violating RCM 1006(d)(3)(A). The junior member did not count the votes (the president did), violating RCM 1006(d)(3)(B). While this could be the result of the president deliberately ignoring the rules, the panel may have just been confused.

The military judge also gave incomplete instructions. He did not instruct that only one vote could be taken on say again which gates and that those votes could not be revisited. While at least one of the aggravating factors (multiple murders) was not an issue, the holdout panel member might have voted against the balancing gate had a vote actually been taken specifically on that gate. If the panel had been thoroughly instructed on the rules, and if the panel had followed those rules, the minority voter may well have voted against death at the balancing gate.

Similarly, in United States v. Thomas (Thomas I), both the panel members and the military judge appeared confused about the rules. After the military judge read the instructions at the conclusion of the merits, the president of

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124 Luginbuhl & Howe, supra note 123, at 1174.

125 Id. at 1167.

126 Id.

127 Id. at 1173.

128 Id. at 1168.

129 SUNDBY, supra note 15, at 49. See also Luginbuhl & Howe, supra note 123, at 1169.

130 SUNDBY, supra note 15, at 49–50.
the panel asked: “I want to say, your instructions on reconsideration, if I understood correctly, we can have several ballots on the issue? We can reconsider at anytime up until the findings has been announced; and then, additionally, before the sentence has been announced.” The correct response from the military judge should have been:

Do not worry about sentencing right now.

Once you have finished deliberating, you will vote by secret, written ballot. The junior member will collect and count those votes. You will then check that count and announce the results.

If the president informs the panel that the finding is not guilty, then if a majority of you would like to reconsider the finding to seek a guilty verdict, let me know and I will give you further instructions.

If the president informs the panel that the finding is guilty, then if more than one-third of you would like to reconsider to seek a not guilty verdict, then let me know and I will give you further instructions.

However, if the president informs the panel that the finding on the capital offense is guilty, but one of you has voted for not guilty on the capital offense, you may not reconsider that vote for the purpose of seeking a unanimous vote in order to authorize a capital sentencing rehearing. You may only reconsider that vote to seek a not-guilty finding.

Compare that to the military judge’s actual response: “If it comes up—if anybody wants to raise the issue that, ‘Hey, I want to talk about this, reconsider it,’ let me know and I’ll give you the instructions on it.” Provided with this incomplete response, the panel then re-voted the finding of guilt on the capital offense in order to raise a seven-two vote to a unanimous vote, which ultimately led to an adopted sentence of death.

In both Loving and Thomas I, the military judges provided incomplete but not incorrect instructions on the specified issues. In United States v. Simoy, the military judge issued a patently incorrect instruction: he told the panel to vote on death before voting on life. The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) reversed, stating:

The instructions to the members should make [clear that] . . . they may not vote on the death penalty first if there is a proposal by any member for a lesser punishment, i.e., life in prison. Some of those members who voted for the death penalty in this case might have agreed with life in prison. Thus, unless they held out on their vote for the lesser punishment of life, three-fourths might very well have agreed on life in prison rather than death. Thus, it was important for the members to understand that, because of requirements for unanimous votes, any one member at any stage of the proceeding could have prevented the death penalty from being imposed.

The court’s reasoning is in concert with the CJP’s findings: a properly educated and instructed panel member might decide to hold on to his or her vote for life. In United States v. Thomas (Thomas II), the CAAF dealt with an error in the military judge’s instructions that had not been raised in Thomas I and found that the military judge’s instructions that the panel should vote on death first was reversible error. One should not be surprised that panel members are confused by the rules when these rules confuse military judges, too.

Juror confusion also has the effect of causing a hung jury. One of the primary concerns of jurors is to avoid

147 Id. at 311-16.

148 Id. at 613-14.

149 United States v. Simoy, 50 M.J. 1, 2-3 (C.A.A.F. 1998). The statement, “any one member at any stage of the proceeding could have prevented the death penalty from being imposed” should be read to mean that at the first three gates, one vote can prevent death from being considered as a sentence, and on the sentencing vote, one vote can prevent death from ultimately being imposed by hanging the jury.

150 Note this interesting contrast between Loving and Thomas. If the panel members vote improperly (they vote out of order or do not vote on certain gates at all) because they are either confused or purposefully choose not to follow the rules, but they do so after having been properly instructed by the military judge, then the appellate courts will not intervene. The appellate courts will let those known, faulty votes stand by finding that the evidence of that improper voting does not satisfy MRE 606b. MCM, supra note 2, MIL. R. EVID. 606(b). The courts will not consider the evidence, or essentially, “hear no evil, see no evil.” See United States v. Loving, 41 M.J. 213, 237-38 (C.A.A.F. 1994); Thomas, 39 M.J. at 636. If, however, the military judge issues an incorrect instruction, and even without evidence that the panel did in fact vote improperly, the courts will find those verdicts untrustworthy. Simoy, 50 M.J. at 2-3; United States v. Thomas (Thomas II), 46 M.J. 311, 312 (C.A.A.F. 1997). That seems to be a paradox within due process but one sanctioned by the Supreme Court. See Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107 (1987).

151 46 M.J. 311.

152 Id. at 315-16.
becoming a hung jury. In his case study, Sundby describes what happened when the holdout juror suggested that the jury deadlock on the sentencing decision. One of the jurors read the instructions and thought that if the jurors deadlocked, then the defendant would automatically get LWOP. The instruction actually said that all that would happen is that a new jury would reconsider the sentence. After incorrectly decoding the instructions, the rest of the jurors became increasingly upset with the idea that this one juror "would now dictate the result." This holdout juror eventually changed his vote.

Something similar happened in Thomas I. Asked why the panel took multiple votes during the guilt deliberations, a panel member "said that they voted more than once to avoid being a ‘hung jury.’ He had understood that a hung jury was ‘a jury that has not reached a unanimous conclusion.’ The military judgment did not instruct the members that they were not required to come to a unanimous conclusion and that they could not reconsider a non-unanimous finding of guilt. Had the panel members returned to the instructions to find the answer, they would not have found it. Instead, they would have found that standard instructions are themselves confusing enough that sometimes military judges cannot get them right. The panel continued to deliberate and re-vote, eventually convicting the accused of a capital offense by an unanimous vote.

In addition to confusion about the rules themselves, another area of significant confusion is the meaning of a life sentence and the meaning of a death sentence. Jurors generally do not believe that a life sentence, either with or without parole, means that the defendant will actually spend his life in prison. Rather, jurors tend to believe that if the defendant does not get the death penalty, he will be back on the street in fifteen years—even in jurisdictions that have LWOP.

Considering that future dangerousness is one of the determining factors in a juror’s decision to vote for death, this issue is no small matter. Jurors are more likely to vote for death when they believe that the alternative to death will result in the defendant’s release from prison. Those who underestimate the parole date are more likely to vote for death, more so as the trial progresses:

Jurors who underestimate the alternative are more likely to vote for death, whether the alternative does or does not permit parole. In fact, it is when jurors think the defendant will return to society in less than twenty years, regardless of how much longer he will actually serve, that they are substantially more likely to vote for death.

If the panel members use their “folk knowledge” about when murderers are paroled, then they may be making uninformed or misinformed decisions about whether someone should live or die.

Understandably, this is a critical issue to jurors. Sundby notes that this is often the area when the jury deadlocks:

Jurors favoring life would have acknowledged that they would of course vote for death if they thought the defendant would ever get out of jail, and the jurors favoring death would have agreed that arguments existed for a life sentence but maintained that a life sentence could not guarantee the defendant would not be back on the streets.

Jurors often ask the trial judge, “If we sentence the defendant to life, will he ever be paroled?” The trial judge usually says that “life means life” or simply rereads the instructions.

This is the rule in the military. In United States v. Simoy, the only options for the panel were life with parole and death. As Sundby would predict, the panel asked the military judge whether the accused could be paroled if sentenced to life and the judge gave the “life means life”

154 Id.
155 Id. at 91.
156 Thomas I, 39 M.J. 626, 638 (N.M.C.M.R. 1993).
157 Id. at 646 (Jones, S.J., dissenting).
160 Bowers & Steiner, supra note 159, 645-48.
response, telling them that whether or not the accused could be paroled was collateral to the sentencing decision and not something that they should consider. In the recent capital court-martial of Master Sergeant Timothy Hennis, the panel was faced with the same issue. The panel asked the military judge if the accused could be paroled if given a life sentence and the military judge replied with the "life means life" instruction.

However, jurors would likely take that response to mean the judge is hiding the fact that the defendant can be paroled. And when jurors remain confused about the meaning of life, they revert to using their folk knowledge about when murderers are released from prison. The result of this confusion is that jurors or panel members may choose death not because it is the appropriate punishment but because it is the least inappropriate of the alternatives that they believe exist—particularly when LWOP is not an option. Commentators call this a "forced choice."

Some jurors who voted for death say that the defendant did not deserve to die, but deserved a true life sentence. They say that they did not believe death was the appropriate punishment, that they wanted LWOP, but that death was their only option in view of what they knew about parole. They say the defendant deserved life; the jury wanted life; but that was not an option. They may even solve the problem by deciding that, because of endless appeals and the rarity of executions, "death" does not mean "death"—it means life spent on death row until the defendant dies of a heart attack. If the jurors believe that the defendant might one day be paroled if given a life or LWOP sentence, but will not be paroled if given a death sentence and will not actually be executed, then jurors may vote for death to punish the defendant with a form of super-LWOP.

Some jurors who voted for death did so in the belief that this was the way to come closest to an LWOP sentence, that it was the only way to keep the defendant in prison for the rest of his life. They became convinced that sentencing the defendant to death would not really mean his execution, but would ensure that he stays in prison for life.

The military has a long appellate process and a high rate of overturning death sentences, and has not executed anyone since 1961. One can reasonably believe that some military panel members believe death does not equal death and so will follow this reasoning.

How a military counsel deals with this question will depend on whether LWOP is available in that particular case. Military defense counsel defending capital cases in which LWOP is not an option should seek to fully inform the panel about the parole process because the rules make it very unlikely that this type of offender will ever be paroled. For example, under Army regulations, an Army service member convicted of murder can only be paroled if the Secretary of the Army or his designee approves the parole board’s recommendation. Panel members who are considering voting for life can be reasonably confident that no Secretary of the Army is going to take the political risk of signing the parole paperwork for someone who has committed the kind of a crime that many people feel warrants a death sentence.

For cases without LWOP as an option, fully informing the panel should lead to more reliable sentences—the panel members will only choose death if death is the appropriate

169 Id. 46.
170 The offense occurred before 1997. Woolverton, supra note 118.
171 Id.
172 Bowers & Steiner, supra note 159, at 673–77.
173 Id.
174 Id. Bowers and Steiner argue that this "forced choice" may be unconstitutional.
175 Id. at 677.
177 Jurors remain skeptical that life without parole actually means that the defendant will never be paroled. Sundby, supra note 25, at 117.
178 Id. at 39.
179 Bowers & Steiner, supra note 159, at 678.
180 Sullivan, supra note 93.
181 In the recent capital court-martial of Master Sergeant Timothy Hennis, the husband and father of the three murder victims expressed that reasoning: the death penalty will "keep him there until that sentenced is carried out or until he dies a natural death, which I think is a just punishment." [the widow] said, and it doesn’t matter to him whether Hennis is executed." Woolverton, supra note 122.
182 U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 15-130, ARMY CLEMENCY AND PAROLE BOARD para. 4-2b (23 Nov. 1998). While an Army service member sentenced to life with parole cannot be paroled from a military prison without approval of the Secretary of the Army or his designee, the service member could be transferred to a federal prison where he would fall under federal parole regulations rather than Army parole regulations. Id. para. 3-1e(9). If that happened, the Secretary of the Army would lose his veto authority over any subsequent parole recommendation. However, the decision to transfer an Army prisoner to a federal prison is wholly the Army’s to make. U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 190-47, THE ARMY CORRECTIONS SYSTEM para. 3-3 (15 June 2006). If the Secretary of the Army wants to prevent someone who has committed a heinous crime but who has been sentenced to life in prison with parole from ever leaving prison, the Secretary of the Army can do that by preventing the service member from being transferred to a federal prison and then vetoing any recommendation for parole that comes before him.
punishment, not the least inappropriate of the sentencing alternatives. If defense counsel simply seek the “life means life” instruction, the CJP findings suggests that the panel will assume that the judge is hiding the fact that the accused can be paroled and will then follow the reasoning outlined above—that he will be paroled, and the best way to prevent his parole is to put him on death row.

In the military, the degree of this “forced choice” problem should be reduced for those cases with offenses committed after the 1997 change to Article 50(a) that authorized LWOP. The CJP findings indicate that many jurors find LWOP to be an appropriate alternative to the death penalty. However, the problem still exists, even in LWOP cases:

[E]ven when the law does in fact provide for LWOP or LWOP+, jurors and members of the general public are unaware of it, or, if they are aware of it, they do not believe it. Instead, they wrongly think the alternative to death is some term of imprisonment short of LWOP. Reality is one thing; perception is another.

To complicate this problem, in the military, LWOP does not mean LWOP. The convening authority can reduce the sentence at action, the President can pardon the accused, or after the accused serves 20 years in prison, the Service Secretary can remit the sentence to life with parole. If the panel asks the military judge whether an accused can ever get out of confinement if given LWOP, what should the military judge say? Here, fully informing the panel might lead to an unreliable sentence: the panel members might choose death not because it is the appropriate sentence but because they believe it is less inappropriate than an LWOP sentence where the accused can technically be paroled.

All military attorneys in the court room—trial counsel, defense counsel, and the military judge—should be committed to ensuring that the panel understands the law and the rules of the deliberative process. All should be committed to reducing panel member confusion. The laws and rules are designed to ensure a reliable sentence, the very lynchpin of death penalty jurisprudence. So far, in at least three of the fourteen modern military capital convictions, panels have not followed the rules or the military judge has issued improper deliberation instructions. This problem can be solved by drafting clear instructions and providing helpful responses to panel member questions. The tougher problem is whether to inform panel members when that information might actually lead to an unreliable sentence, such as when the panel asks about the meaning of LWOP.

**Juror Responsibility**

An earlier discussion touched upon an issue related to juror responsibility: the belief held by some jurors that if they vote for death, the defendant will never be executed. The reasoning is that if a juror believes that the defendant will never be executed, then the juror will not really feel that he is responsible for his decision because it will never be carried out. The broader theory of juror responsibility is that:

[T]he decisions of people who feel personally responsible for an outcome differ from the decisions where the individual assumes no such responsibility...particularly when the decision involves consequences to the welfare of another person...Given that a life or death decision during the sentencing phase of a capital trial is as important a consequence to another person as there can be, it follows that the degree of responsibility experienced by a jury would impact on capital decisions.

Theodore Eisenberg and colleagues further refine juror responsibility into role responsibility and causal responsibility. Role responsibility is “the obligations one has flowing from a role one has assumed...[T]he capital sentencing context, role responsibility focuses on whether jurors understand and accept the primary responsibility they have for the defendant’s sentence in the role they have assumed as sentencer.” A juror might believe that someone other than himself has the primary role in making the sentencing decision, or that he is carrying out the decision on behalf of someone else. Jurors might shift responsibility for their decision to any number of places, to include the law, if, as discussed earlier, the jurors incorrectly believe that the law requires a death sentence; to the judge; to the community; or to the other jurors, through

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183 Eisenberg et al., *The Deadly Paradox*, supra note 159, at 391.

184 Id. at 395–96.

185 UCMJ art. 56a(b)(1)(A) (2008).

186 Id. art. 56a(b)(3).

187 MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 1108(b).

188 In the *Military Judges’ Benchbook*, the only guidance is for the military judge to say that LWOP means “confinement for life without eligibility for parole.” *MILITARY JUDGES’ BENCHBOOK*, supra note 61, para. 8-3–46.

de-individualization and group dynamics, as discussed earlier.\textsuperscript{196} The CJP provides evidence that some jurors do shift role responsibility.\textsuperscript{197} "Most jurors accept role responsibility though a disquietingly large minority do not."\textsuperscript{198} And the degree to which jurors feel responsible for the sentencing decision appears to be modestly correlated to the final vote: "[W]e find limited evidence that jurors who impose life sentences accept more responsibility than do jurors who impose death sentences."\textsuperscript{199}

The other type of juror responsibility is causal responsibility. Causal responsibility is "whether or not, and how strongly, someone or something figures in the causal chain leading to some outcome . . . [including] all of the factors that might be responsible for the defendant's sentence, including, most importantly, the conduct of the defendant himself."\textsuperscript{200} If a juror (understandably) believes that the defendant is primarily responsible for his own sentence, that lessens the juror's feeling of personal responsibility for the sentence—and the CJP findings indicate that jurors do shift causal responsibility to the defendant.\textsuperscript{201} Another significant factor in causal responsibility is the belief held by some jurors that the defendant will never be executed—the "death does not mean death" belief.\textsuperscript{202} "A clear majority say that 'very few' death-sentenced defendants will ever be executed, and about 70 percent of jurors believe that 'less than half' or 'very few' will be executed."\textsuperscript{203}

Of the ways that jurors can shift responsibility, some may not apply to any degree in courts-martial. Toward role responsibility, judges do not play a role in the military's capital sentencing scheme. But some may apply as well to courts-martial as they do to civilian trials. Panel members may shift role responsibility to other jurors through group dynamics or to the law by mistakenly believing that the law sometimes requires the death penalty, and may shift causal responsibility to the accused. Some may apply with even greater force. Toward causal responsibility, one can reasonably assume that a court-martial panel member will have more confidence that the accused will not be executed than a juror on a Texas jury.

One type of role responsibility may have special significance in the military: the shift of responsibility to the community. Steven Sherman describes the shift to the community in the civilian context as follows:

Jurors are informed that they have been chosen as representatives of the community, and that they must represent the moral values of that community. In a capital case, there is often outrage and anger in the community-at-large about the murder. Cries for retribution and a death sentence are common. Believing that they are simply conduits for the expression of community values can greatly diminish the jurors' personal sense of responsibility.\textsuperscript{204}

In the military context, add to this the special role of the convening authority in the administration of military justice, both before and after the court-martial.

Capital cases are unique in that these are the only courts-martial in which the convening authority, by the very act of referral, has communicated to the panel what he thinks is the appropriate sentence in that case. The panel members can reasonably assume that the convening authority believes that death is the appropriate sentence; otherwise, the convening authority would not have referred the case with a capital instruction. Military attorneys tend to analyze problems like this using the framework for unlawful command influence\textsuperscript{205} (and maybe this is a form of unintended but \textit{per se} unlawful command influence), but for a capital defense counsel, this referral process presents additional problems. If the panel member believes, or even just thinks, that he is simply a conduit for the expression of the convening authority's values, then he may shift role responsibility for his decision to the convening authority. Another problem exists: the panel members may shift role responsibility to the convening authority in the way that civilian jurors might shift responsibility to the judiciary. Panel members who are aware that a convening authority can reduce a sentence (and one should assume that panel members know this) may opt for a higher sentence believing that if they miss the convening authority's target, the convening authority will reduce the sentence later.

This is not a fanciful problem. In \textit{United States v. Dugan},\textsuperscript{206} the convening authority had held meetings where he discussed military justice issues in an inappropriate way, essentially saying that there was no room in the military for

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{192} Id. at 1245.  \\
\textsuperscript{196} Id. at 1246.  \\
\textsuperscript{198} Eisenberg et al., \textit{Jury Responsibility}, supra note 159, at 349.  \\
\textsuperscript{199} Id. at 341, 376–77.  \\
\textsuperscript{200} Id. at 340–41. \textit{See also} Sherman, supra note 28, at 1244.  \\
\textsuperscript{201} Eisenberg et al., \textit{Jury Responsibility}, supra note 159, at 341.  \\
\textsuperscript{202} Id. at 340. \textit{See also} Sherman, supra note 28, at 1245.  \\
\textsuperscript{203} Eisenberg et al., \textit{Jury Responsibility}, supra note 159, at 363.  \\
\textsuperscript{204} Sherman, supra note 28, at 1245.  \\
\textsuperscript{205} Convening authorities cannot tell panel members what the appropriate punishment is for an accused. \textit{United States v. Baldwin}, 54 M.J. 308, 310 (C.A.A.F. 2001).  \\
\textsuperscript{206} 58 M.J. 253 (C.A.A.F. 2003).
\end{flushleft}
drug users. The military judge allowed voir dire on this issue but that remedy was not good enough—apparently, the remaining panel members were still concerned about what the convening authority would think of their sentence because they talked about that in the deliberation room. According to a letter filed by the junior member of the panel, "a couple of the panel members expressed the notion that a Bad Conduct Discharge was a 'given' for a person with these charges" and "a panel member reminded us that our sentence would be reviewed by the convening authority and we needed to make sure our sentence was sending a consistent message." This was not a capital case but still shows that panel members think—and even talk—about how the convening authority will think about their sentence. This process shifts role responsibility away from the panel member and onto the convening authority.

To ensure panel members retain responsibility for their decisions, in capital cases the defense counsel should ask the judge to "instruct jurors that the decision they are about to make is, despite its legal trappings, a moral one and that, in the absence of legal error, their judgment will be final." Counsel should explore in voir dire what the panel members think about the fact that the convening authority referred the case with a capital instruction. And counsel should explore with the panel members in voir dire whether they would shift role responsibility for their individual decisions onto the panel as a whole—as in, whether they would concede their personal, conscientious decision to the majority because of group pressure.

**Colorado Voir Dire**

The CJP has influenced one of the major revolutions in capital trial work—the development of the Colorado voir dire method. One of the CJP findings is that most juries start deliberations with at least some jurors who support a life sentence. David Wymore recognized that the key for defense counsel is to find a way to preserve those potential votes. Essentially, he set out to find a way around the force of social conformity that Asch documented.

Asch described the subject's quandary in his experiment as this, which, as it turns out, is much the same as the quandary that many capital jurors believe they are in:

The subject knows (1) that the issue is one of fact; (2) that a correct result is possible; (3) that only one result is correct; (4) that the others and he are oriented to and reporting about the same objectively given relations; (5) that the group is in unanimous opposition at certain points with him.

However, if the juror knows that his decision is a moral, not necessarily factual, decision; that more than one resolution of this complex problem is possible; that he must decide for himself what the resolution should be; and that it is acceptable to be in opposition to the majority, then the force of social conformity might be significantly defused. If Asch had told his subjects that more than one result was possible and that the majority might have it wrong, the results of his experiment would likely have been much different.

David Wymore pioneered a new method of voir dire for use in capital cases that, among other things, seeks to reduce the force of social conformity and get the life votes out of the deliberation room. Called the Colorado voir dire method (Wymore was practicing in Colorado when he developed this method), the method has two basic parts. The first part is designed to get jurors to accurately express their views on capital punishment and mitigation in order for the defense to rationally exercise their peremptory challenges and to build grounds for challenges for cause. The second part is designed to address the Asch findings on group dynamics. This part focuses on teaching the juror the rules.

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207 Id. at 254.

208 Id. at 255.

209 Id. The court took the unintended unlawful command influence issue seriously and returned the case for a fact finding hearing: "It is exactly this type of command presence in the deliberation room—whether intended by the command or not—that chills the members' independent judgment and deprives an accused of his or her constitutional right to a fair and impartial trial." Id. at 259.

210 Eisenberg et al., Jury Responsibility, supra note 159, at 379.

211 Bowers et al., at 1491–96; Sandsy, supra note 26.


213 ASCH, supra note 16, at 461.


216 This is a very simplified description of the method. The method is generally taught over a three or four day hands-on seminar. The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers generally offers one training seminar on the Colorado method every year. See CLE & Events, NAT'L ASS'N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, http://www.nacdl.org/meetings (last visited Oct. 7, 2010). One of these seminars has been captured on video and is available for training. Videotape: Selecting a Colorado Jury—One Vote for Life, supra note 211. See generally Richard S. Jaffe, Capital Cases: Ten Principles for Individualized Voir Dire on the Death Penalty, CHAMPION, Jan. 2001, at 35.

217 Under the Colorado method, defense counsel exercise their peremptory challenges based only on the juror's death views. The method uses a ranking system based on juror responses. This portion of the method (the wise use of the peremptory challenge) plays a small role when Colorado voir dire is used in a court-martial. In the federal system, the defense gets twenty peremptory challenges in a capital case. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b). However, in the military, the accused in a capital case only gets one. MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 912(f)(4). In the military, defense counsel should focus on building grounds for challenge for cause.
for deliberation; that he is making an individual moral
decision;\textsuperscript{218} that he needs to respect the decisions of others;
and that he is entitled to have his individual decision
respected by the group. The goal is not to teach the juror to
change everyone else’s mind— the goal is to teach the
juror how not to fold and to teach the other jurors to respect
everyone else’s opinions.

The method is grounded in constitutional law\textsuperscript{219} and fits
within the framework of the military’s liberal grant mandate.
The liberal grant mandate is a response to the unique nature
of the military justice system, “because in courts-martial
peremptory challenges are much more limited than in most
civilian courts and because the manner of appointment of
court-martial members presents perils that are not
encountered elsewhere.”\textsuperscript{220} The reasoning is that since the
convening authority can hand-pick the panel members, in
fairness, the defense counsel should be able to conduct voir
dire of the panel members and then the military judge should
give the Defense the benefit of the doubt on challenges when
an issue arises.

Defense counsel should anticipate possible objections to
the use of this method of voir dire and litigate any issues that
might implicate panel dynamics, panel confusion, and panel
member responsibility to establish a foundation for using the
method. The defense counsel will probably not receive the
direct remedy requested in the motion but likely will receive
a different, valuable remedy: the ability to voir dire the
panel members on that issue. For example, the defense
counsel should file motions to have the junior member
appointed as the president; require random panel member
selection; find per se unlawful command influence in the
referral process; change the place of trial based on pretrial
publicity; trifurcate the trial into a merits, aggravating factor,
and sentencing phase to reduce panel member confusion;\textsuperscript{221}
allow an opening statement in the presenting proceeding
because of potential panel member confusion; request certain
instructions; request additional peremptory challenges and limit government peremptory challenges and challenges for cause; allow parole rules and statistics as
mitigation; etc.

For the military defense counsel who is detailed to a
capital case, training in the Colorado method is the most
important capital-specific training to receive.\textsuperscript{222} If the
counsel in Thomas I had known of and used the Colorado
method, the outcome at trial may well have been different.
Had the panel members been educated on the rules and then
followed them, they very likely would not have re-voted the
initial guilt finding and the case would not have reached the
presentencing proceeding with death as an authorized punishment.\textsuperscript{223} Similarly, in Loving, the outcome at trial
may have been different had the holdout panel member been
educated on the rules. He may have voted against death at the
balancing gate.\textsuperscript{224}

In these two cases, teaching the members techniques to
withstand group pressure may have helped to preserve the
holdout votes: in both cases, the minority voters fell in the
range where the minority block will fold (in Loving, one of
eight voters, or 12%; in Thomas I, two of nine voters, or 22%). Getting the president of the panel to commit to
following the rules may have helped to preserve the votes.
This would have prevented the possibility of the subtle
influence of rank in the panel room, as might have occurred
in Loving and Thomas I.

With proper instructions and thorough voir dire, the
defense counsel can address all of these dynamics—the
force of social conformity, the subtle pressure of rank in the
deliberation, juror confusion, voting rules, the parole
problem, and juror responsibility. Using the Colorado
method will not ensure a life sentence—some crimes may
warrant the death penalty from a qualified panel—but using
this method should help ensure a reliable sentence in which
every member votes his or her conscience rather than the
group’s opinion.

Conclusion

Hopefully, this overview of the CJP has reduced the
space occupied by the capital Unknown Unknowns. In your
capital case, you should realize that your panel members will
behave in ways consistent with the CJP findings on juror
dynamics. You should realize that your panel members
might be confused about the law and the rules. You should

\textsuperscript{219} See John H. Blume et al., Probing “Life Qualification” Through
\textsuperscript{220} United States v. James, 61 M.J. 132, 139 (C.A.A.F. 2005). See also
United States v. Downing, 56 M.J. 419, 422 (C.A.A.F. 2002); United States
\textsuperscript{221} Donald M. Houser, Note, Reconciling Ring v. Arizona with the Current
Structure of the Federal Capital Murder Trial: The Case for Trifurcation,
64 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 349 (2007).
\textsuperscript{222} Prior to the passage of Article 52a in 2001, which requires twelve
members in a capital court martial, capital courts-martial only required the
same number of panel members that are required in any general court-
martial—five. UCMJ arts. 16(a)(A), 52a (2008). Some cases that
originated before this change suggested to defense counsel that they should
not strike members from panels in order to raise the total number of panel
members from five to something much larger, which would therefore
increase the odds that one panel member might be seated who would
eventually vote for life. See United States v. Simoy, 46 M.J. 592, 627 (A.F.
number of panel members is twelve, that advice is inapplicable and should
not be followed. We also now know from the CJP findings that that advice
may have been to no avail anyway: even if the panel grew to a size where
one potential life vote were seated, if he were the only life vote, he would
change his vote anyway.
\textsuperscript{223} Thomas’ death sentence was set aside. United States v. Thomas, 46 M.J.
311 (C.A.A.F. 1997).
\textsuperscript{224} Loving still faces the death penalty. United States v. Loving, 68 M.J. 1
(C.A.A.F. 2009).
realize that your panel members might shift responsibility to
other actors in the case. And you should realize that you
must learn the Colorado method of voir dire so that you can
address all of those dynamics.

Still, the CJP covers much more than jury dynamics,
juror confusion, and juror responsibility. Depending on your
case, it may offer additional insight into areas like race,
religion, the effect of the accused not testifying, jurors’
views on experts,225 victim impact testimony, and more. But
the CJP is not everything. The void of Unknown Unknowns
is great. Should defense counsel approach the victims and
survivors?226 How do you present or rebut the case for
future dangerousness? What is impaired executive
functioning? I am sure that there are many more—I just do
not know what they are. They are, after all, Unknown
Unknowns.

Although this article has examined three capital courts-
martial in which the panels appeared to act and think
consistently with the CJP findings and three capital courts-
martial in which panel members and judges appeared
confused, some may still question whether the CJP findings
can apply to court-martial practice. The only way to truly
resolve that question is to conduct research on military
panels, capital and non-capital. One might quickly respond
that the rules do not allow anyone to talk to panel members,
thereby preventing research. But do the rules say that?
Almost all of the rules that one can point to deal with
whether evidence of what happened in the deliberation room
can be admitted in court.227 Those rules do not prohibit a
panel member from talking to a researcher. The apparent
prohibition comes from an unlikely source—the oath given
to panel members. The text of the oath is not mandated by
the Uniform Code of Military Justice; rather, Article 42(a)
simply states that the service secretaries shall prescribe the
form of oaths.228 The Secretary of the Army did so in Army
Regulation 27-10, directing that this oath be used: “[T]hat
you will not disclose or discover the vote or opinion of any
particular member of the court (upon a challenge or) upon
the findings or sentence unless required to do so in due
course of law.”229 The primary purpose behind the rules,
and presumably, this oath, is to protect freedom of
deliberation, protect the stability and finality of verdicts,
and prevent unlawful command influence.230

Researchers could ask questions that prevent a panel
member from violating this oath (say, by not identifying any
particular member’s vote or opinion) while still respecting
the values underlying the MREs and RCMs—and these rules
would then govern any statements made by a panel member
to a researcher if someone wanted to introduce them in the
particular court-martial of which one of these panel
members was a member. A well-crafted, properly-
conducted sociological research project could call into
question many of our assumptions about whether rank plays
a role in the deliberation room or whether panel members
follow instructions. Research could cause us to reexamine
the legal fictions that are found throughout the common law.
Research could shed light on how our panels approach
sexual assault cases. And, most importantly, properly
conducted research can help military attorneys fully
understand their audience so that they can present cases to
them in ways that will allow them to solve the difficult
problems they are given. Military justice can certainly
benefit from that.


227 See MCM, supra note 2, Mil. R. Evid. 509 & 606; R.C.M. 923 discussion; R.C.M. 1007(c).

228 UCMJ art. 42(a) (2008).

229 U.S. Dep’t of Army, REG. 27-10, MILITARY JUSTICE para. 11-8c (16 Nov. 2005) (hereinafter AR 27-10). This is the same as the suggested oath found in MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 807(b)(2) discussion. As a practical matter, the oath given in all Army courts-martial is that found in the MILITARY JUDGES’ BENCHBOOK, supra note 612, para. 2-5, which is the same as that in AR 27-10 and the RCM 807(b)(2) discussion except that the parentheses were dropped. However, at the end of the members’ service, the trial judge is supposed to give this instruction: “If you are asked about your service on this court-martial, I remind you of the oath you took. Essentially, the oath prevents you from discussing your deliberations with anyone, to include stating any member’s opinion or vote, unless ordered to do so by a court.” Id. para. 2-5-25 (emphasis added). That is an incorrect statement—the oath required by the MCM and Army regulations is much narrower.