The Inherent Power to Impose Sanctions: How a Federal Judge is Like an 800-pound Gorilla

Thomas E. Baker

Florida International University College of Law

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Barrels of ink have been spilled over Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, the sanctions rule. It has been panned and praised by seemingly equal numbers of experts and insiders in countless law journals and judicial opinions. Polarizing in the abstract, the Rule often surfaces in closely contested and highly visible litigation; it seems that every trial lawyer has a Rule 11 horror story to tell. Perhaps no other Rule has been more frequently the object of intense study and debate.
Debate over sanctions has captured the attention of the legal profession following each Rule 11 amendment. Curiously, there are no Goldilocks who find the Rule "just right"; everyone complains that it is either too strong or too weak.

But in a significant sense, all the debate and controversy is beside the point. Suppose that someone said that a federal judge has the power to impose sanctions without the authority of Rule 11 and would have the power even if Rule 11 were abolished? In fact, the highest authority has said so. In a 1991 decision, Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., the Supreme Court held, in essence, that a federal

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2. Rule 11 was amended in 1983 and 1993. The 1983 amendments were intended to "put teeth" into the sanctioning provisions, and that is how the federal courts have understood them. See, e.g., Willy v. Coastal Corp., 112 S. Ct. 1076 (1992) (upholding the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions even after a subsequent determination that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction); Business Guides Inc. v. Chromatic Enters. Inc., 498 U.S. 333, 347 (1991) (holding that "a represented party who signs his or her name bears a personal, nondelegable responsibility to certify the truth and reasonableness of the document"); Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 395 (1990) (holding that a district court may impose Rule 11 sanctions after a plaintiff voluntarily dismisses the action); Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120 (1989) (deciding that Rule 11 sanctions may be imposed on an attorney who signs papers but not on the attorney's law firm); Estate of Calloway v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 9 F.3d 237, 239 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding counsel jointly and severally liable for the client's Rule 11 violation).


judge is like the proverbial 800-pound gorilla. The majority held that federal judges have all of the judicial power necessary to manage their own proceedings and to control the conduct of those who appear before them, including the inherent power to punish abuses of the judicial process. Thus, federal judges have a license to sanction lawyers and litigants virtually at will and without regard to any limitations in the Rules and statutes.

Presumably, nearly every litigator is aware that Rule 11 is not the exclusive source of sanctioning authority. For example, other rules of procedure authorize sanctions at the trial level as well as on
Several federal statutes also authorize the award of attorney's fees to prevailing parties in specified kinds of cases. 8

7. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(f) (providing that if, in relation to a scheduling conference, a party or attorney fails to obey an order, fails to appear, is substantially unprepared, or fails to participate in good faith, the court may (1) refuse to allow the party to support or oppose designated claims or defenses, (2) prohibit the party from introducing designated matters in evidence, (3) strike pleadings in whole or in part, (4) stay proceedings, (5) dismiss the action, (6) render a default judgment, or (7) issue a contempt order); id. 26(g)(3) (providing a court with the authority to impose reasonable cost, including attorney's fees, for an improper certification of disclosure); id. 37 (authorizing sanctions for a failure to properly disclose or cooperate in discovery); id. 41(b) (providing for the imposition of costs for a previously dismissed action if the same plaintiff commences an action based upon or including the same claim asserted against the same defendant); id. 55 (authorizing entry of default judgment); FED. R. AP. P. 38 (authorizing the imposition of damages and costs upon a party who asserts a frivolous appeal or delays the proceedings). See generally ROBERT E. RODES, JR., ET AL., SANCTIONS IMPOSABLE FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: A REPORT TO THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER (1981) (discussing sanctions that can be imposed pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 11, 16, 36, 37, 41(b), and 55).

In Chambers, the court of appeals had imposed sanctions under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 for attorney's fees and double costs as a penalty for frivolously appealing a decision. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 40; see also THOMAS E. BAKER, A PRIMER ON THE JURISDICTION OF THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS § 5.04 (1989) (discussing appellate sanctions).

There are also general statutes that authorize trial and appellate sanctions.9 Finally, litigants may initiate an independent action for malicious prosecution or abuse of process.10 But the Chambers Court recognized an inherent power that exists in federal courts qua courts,11 although this somewhat curious power, analogous to the contempt power,12 may not be familiar to litigators and perhaps some judges. The plaintiff in Chambers certainly learned an expensive lesson when the Supreme Court approved the district court's order that the plaintiff pay the defendant's expenses and attorney's fees, which totaled nearly one million dollars.13

The inherent power is at once broader and narrower than the Rule 11 power.14 Rule 11 focuses on specific abuses and is not limited to willful conduct; in contrast, the inherent power reaches the full range of litigation misconduct, but authorizes fee shifting only for bad-faith conduct or willful disobedience of a court's orders.15 To exercise its inherent sanctioning authority, a federal court may

9. See 28 U.S.C. § 1912 (1994) (authorizing the award to a prevailing party of just damages for delay); id. § 1927 (1994) (authorizing the imposition of personal liability for excess costs, expenses, and attorney's fees on those litigators guilty of unreasonable conduct before a federal court).


12. See Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265, 275 (1990) (discussing the limits of the contempt and equitable powers of a federal court); see generally Thomas E. Baker, Contempt Power of the Courts, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 193 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1992) (describing the derivation of the contempt power from the Judiciary Act of 1789, Ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81 (1789), and explaining that the power is necessary because the federal courts must be able to enforce their judgments and orders).


14. Id. at 46 (White, J.); Partee, supra note 4, at 118-19.

15. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 46-47. Justice Scalia, dissenting, agreed that the inherent power would reach "situations involving less than bad faith." Id. at 58 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
act—sua sponte or upon a motion to conduct an independent investigation—as long as its actions are consonant with the basic procedural due process guarantees of reasonable notice, a meaningful opportunity to be heard, and particularized findings.\textsuperscript{16} Appropriate sanctions can be as extreme as dismissing the lawsuit or vacating a previously entered judgment upon the demonstration of fraud upon the court.\textsuperscript{17} Lesser sanctions, including the award of attorney's fees and costs and various forms of attorney discipline, are also within the district court's informed discretion. Presumably, any sanction contemplated under federal statutes and rules can be imposed incident to the inherent power as well.\textsuperscript{18}

\begin{enumerate}
\item FED. R. CIV. P. 11 Advisory Committee's Notes; see also Henry J. Friendly, \textit{Some Kind of Hearing}, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1279-95 (1975) (discussing the elements of a fair hearing, including (1) an unbiased tribunal, (2) notice of the proposed action and the alleged grounds, (3) an opportunity to argue against the action, (4) an opportunity to present witnesses, (5) an open presentation of the evidence alleged to support the proposed action, (6) a decision based solely upon the evidence presented, (7) the assistance of counsel, (8) public attendance, (9) the establishment of a record, (10) a statement of the reasons justifying the outcome, and (11) judicial review).
\item Statutes of limitations do not exist in this context: "[E]ven under Rule 11, sanctions may be imposed years after a judgment on the merits." \textit{Chambers}, 501 U.S. at 56.
\item As the Advisory Committee has explained,
\begin{quote}
The court has available a variety of possible sanctions to impose for violations, such as striking the offending paper; issuing an admonition, reprimand, or censure; requiring participation in seminars or other educational programs; ordering a fine payable to the court; referring the matter to disciplinary authorities (or, in the case of government attorneys, to the Attorney General, Inspector General, or agency head), etc.
\end{quote}
\textit{FED. R. CIV. P. 11 Advisory Committee's Notes.}
\begin{quote}
An objection might be raised to a sanction imposed under the inherent power that might not be raised, in theory, under the rules. For example, Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 provides that if a court of appeals determines that an appeal is frivolous, it may award "just damages and single or double costs" against the appellant. FED. R. APP. P. 38. Suppose a court, after affording procedural due process, imposes the sanction of double costs under its inherent power. The award could be challenged as intrinsically arbitrary because, first, the definition of costs is idiosyncratic, and second, doubling the costs is purely retributive. One way for the court to avoid the issue altogether, of course, is to invoke the authority of the inherent power and to invoke Rule 38 in the alternative.
\end{quote}
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The statement in the text accompanying this footnote, however, is more right than wrong for several reasons. First, the matter is given over to the informed
Inherent sanctions, like Rule 11 sanctions, may be imposed against any person responsible for wrongdoing, regardless of whether that person is a litigant or an attorney.\footnote{FED. R. CIV. P. 11 Advisory Committee’s Notes (“The sanction should be imposed on the persons—whether attorneys, law firms, or parties—who have violated the rule or who may be determined to be responsible for the violation.”).} Sanctionable wrongdoing includes prelitigation misconduct\footnote{Chambers, 501 U.S. at 60 (Scalia, J., dissenting); \emph{id.} at 70-71 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).} as well as abuses of process that occur beyond the courtroom, such as the willful disobedience of an otherwise valid court order, so long as the court affords a violator due process before imposing sanctions.\footnote{Id. at 46.} In addition to Rule 11’s function as a deterrent, inherent sanctions further the goals of compensation and punishment.

In \emph{Chambers}, the Court explicitly distinguished the inherent power from other authorizations to sanction.\footnote{Id. at 46-48.} The general scheme of authorizations under statutes and rules does not displace the inherent power that predates it.\footnote{Id. at 50.} Ordinarily, bad-faith misconduct should be dealt with under the Rules, but the Court added that “if in the informed discretion of the court, neither the statute nor the rules are up to the task, the court may safely rely on its inherent power.”\footnote{Chambers, 501 U.S. at 49-50; \emph{id.} at 60-61 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); \emph{The Supreme Court, 1990 Term, supra} note 4, at 356 (recognizing the breadth of the inherent powers, which are those necessary to further the exercise of all of a court’s other powers, but suggesting that the inherent powers are nonetheless limited).} Even when the misconduct could properly be sanctioned under Rule 11, however, a court may rely on its inherent power.\footnote{Id. at 50.} The power is inherent in a court, not a case, and the power applies even in a diversity case in which the controlling state law would not
allow a sanction. Moreover, the Court held that the decision to impose sanctions under the inherent power was subject to review only under the rather deferential abuse-of-discretion standard applicable under Rule 11.27

While the Supreme Court itself has not revisited the issue since 1991, the lower federal courts have internalized the inherent power to sanction. Twenty-one different district courts have invoked the inherent power recognized in Chambers.28 Furthermore, all of the

26. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 51-55; see also The Supreme Court, 1990 Term, supra note 4, at 359 (arguing that the use of inherent power is invalid if it is not supported by a legitimate basis).


federal courts of appeals have had occasion to apply Chambers. Ten of the thirteen federal appellate courts have applied the Chambers rationale to affirm or uphold sanctions such as

1. fee shifting for misconduct that included the plaintiff's repeated failure to attend hearings;\(^{29}\)
2. fee shifting under both the inherent power of the court and Section 1927 of Title 27 of the United States Code;\(^{20}\)
3. requiring counsel to serve, without compensation, as standby counsel for a criminal defendant;\(^{31}\)
4. sanctioning a lack of candor with the court;\(^{32}\)


29. Jones v. Winnepesaukee Realty, 990 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1993).
31. United States v. Bertoli, 994 F.2d 1002, 1018 (3d Cir. 1993); \textit{cf.} Spain v. Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439, 455-56 (3d Cir. 1994) (recognizing the inherent power to sanction but finding that the district court’s imposition of jury costs was an abuse of discretion because there was no record of bad-faith conduct or abuse of the judicial process).
5. awarding a defendant $2.4 million in attorney’s fees for the plaintiff’s failure to comply with a court order to submit attorney fee information;\textsuperscript{33}

6. dismissing a lawsuit because of a plaintiff’s destruction of evidence in violation of a protective order;\textsuperscript{34}

7. imposing monetary sanctions against defense counsel for \textit{ex parte} contacts that violated ethical rules;\textsuperscript{35}

8. excluding expert-witness testimony and allowing an adverse inference to be drawn from a party’s spoliation of evidence despite the absence of a showing of bad faith;\textsuperscript{36}

9. dismissing a \textit{pro se} Section 1983 action for failure to obey a court order;\textsuperscript{37}

10. excluding a party’s evidence because of spoliation;\textsuperscript{38}

11. ordering a party to show cause why double-cost sanctions should not be imposed for intentionally misleading the court;\textsuperscript{39}

12. and fining defendant $5000 and defendant’s counsel $500 for repeated discovery abuses.\textsuperscript{40}


\textsuperscript{34} Marrocco v. General Motors Corp., 966 F.2d 220, 223-24 (7th Cir. 1992) (upholding the sanction without reference to \textit{Chambers} as an appropriate response to “contumacious conduct”).

\textsuperscript{35} Harlan v. Lewis, 982 F.2d 1255, 1261 (8th Cir. 1993).

\textsuperscript{36} Dillon v. Nissan Motor Co., 986 F.2d 263, 269 (8th Cir. 1993).

\textsuperscript{37} Rhones v. Rowland, 1 F.3d 1249 (9th Cir. 1993) (reported in table without opinion). While the court released no official opinion, an unofficial opinion can be found on LEXIS. Rhones v. Rowland, No. 92-15774, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 30130, at *1 (9th Cir. Nov. 8, 1993).

\textsuperscript{38} Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. v. Lakewood Eng’g & Mfg. Corp., 982 F.2d 363, 369 (9th Cir. 1992).

\textsuperscript{39} Ruoti v. Mercier, 1 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 1993) (reported in table without opinion). While the court released no official opinion, an unofficial opinion can be found on LEXIS. Ruoti v. Mercier, No. 92-4147, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 18765, at *3 (10th Cir. July 21, 1993).

While the three remaining courts of appeals have formally recognized the inherent power described in *Chambers*, they have thus far reversed all sanctions imposed by district courts.\(^{41}\)

Caveat Litigator!\(^{42}\) Vigorous and widespread imposition of sanctions does not depend on the construction—or the deconstruction—of the Rule 11 language. The drafters of the 1993 amendments intended to make Rule 11 "kinder and gentler"; generally, they hoped to decrease the likelihood and the severity of sanctions. Indeed, Justice Scalia dissented from the approval of the amendments because he worried that the changes would "render the Rule toothless."\(^{43}\) Those amendments, however, took nothing away from the inherent power to impose sanctions, a power that courts may now apply more frequently.

In conclusion, I submit the following Madisonian postscript: We should always look askance upon any assertion of an inherent power by any branch of the federal government.\(^{44}\) The danger is more

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\(^{41}\) An example of the Sixth Circuit's reasoning can be found in Grossman v. Garratt & Evans, P.C., 992 F.2d 1216 (6th Cir. 1993) (reported in table without opinion). While the court released no official opinion, an unofficial opinion can be found on LEXIS. Grossman v. Garratt & Evans, P.C., No. 92-1407, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 10533, at *9 (6th Cir. Apr. 30, 1993) (reversing costs and attorney's fees sanctions because of a lack of justification under Rule 11 and inherent power). See also Sun-Tek Indus., Inc. v. Kennedy Sky Lites, Inc., No. 92-1162, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 1605, at *6 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 29, 1993) (reversing a fee-shifting sanction because no evidence of misconduct appeared in the record); United States v. Wallace, 964 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (reversing a monetary sanction because a bad-faith finding was clearly erroneous).

\(^{42}\) "[T]o allow punishment to take the form of such a generic, all-encompassing, massive, post-trial retribution . . . would send shivers through the bar." *In re Yagman*, 796 F.2d 1165, 1185 (9th Cir. 1986), *cert. denied sub nom.* Real v. Yagman, 484 U.S. 963 (1987).

\(^{43}\) *Amendments to the Federal Rules, supra* note 2, at 507 (Scalia, J., dissenting); *see also* Karen N. Moor, *The Supreme Court's Role in Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure*, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1039, 1040 (1993) (discussing the Supreme Court's application of the "plain meaning" rationale to rule interpretation and arguing for the Court to use a more activist interpretation to achieve the Rules' underlying purpose).

\(^{44}\) But what is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty is this: you must
obvious when inherent powers are asserted by the political branches, but it is also implicated here, since the Article III judicial power is, likewise, merely an enumerated power. Under the Constitution, federal tribunals are the limited courts of the same limited sovereign. Furthermore, the principle of separation of powers cautions federal judges from acting contrary to or inconsistent with federal statutes; federal courts are likewise obliged to follow the rules of procedure promulgated under the Rules Enabling Act.

Nevertheless, federal courts do possess an inherent power to impose sanctions, separately and independently of any rule or statute—so says the highest Court of 800-pound gorillas.

[The Federalist No. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see also Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 58-60 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that Congress may specify how the inherent powers of the President will be exercised so long as the specifications do not impair that power).]


46. Id.; see also, e.g., Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 114 S. Ct. 1673, 1676-77 (1994) (holding that a district court does not have the inherent power under the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction to enforce the terms of a settlement agreement).


47. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2071-2075, 2077 (1988); see Chambers, 501 U.S. 60-67 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that the legislature, not the judiciary, possesses constitutional responsibility for defining sanctions and fees).