The first Part of this Article briefly describes the doctrinal development of the current Supreme Court position on corporate speech. It will demonstrate that, although the doctrinal messages sent by the Court undoubtedly have been mixed, the modern trend appears unmistakably away from extending full-fledged constitutional protection to corporate speech. In the second Part, the Article makes the theoretical case for the constitutional protection of corporate speech from both the positive and negative perspectives of First Amendment theory. The final Part will respond to the theories that support the total exclusion of corporate speech from the scope of the constitutional guarantee. It will conclude that none of these theories in any way justifies such exclusion.
Howard M. Wasserman,
What’s Good for General Motors: Corporate Speech and the Theory of Free Expression
, 66 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 235
Available at: https://ecollections.law.fiu.edu/faculty_publications/77