The Silent Bench: How the Chilean Judiciary Failed to Check Pinochet's Executive Power and the Continued Struggle for Judicial Independence

Authors

• Daniela González García

Abstract

Although authoritarian regimes are often associated with lawlessness, many consolidate power through carefully crafted legal framework that create the illusion of illegality. Chile under Augusto Pinochet offers a critical case study of this phenomenon. In Chile, Pinochet ushered in his “authoritarian legality” after spearheading a military coup in 1973 that toppled a democratically elected left-wing government. Through Chile’s 1980 Constitution, drafted by hand-picked loyalists and approved in a tightly controlled setting, Pinochet’s regime embedded executive supremacy, restricted judicial review, and transformed Chile’s courts into a silent bench. Applying David S. Clark’s theory that judicial review must be evaluated within a state’s political environment, this paper argues that the 1980 Constitution structurally constrained Chile’s judiciary, preventing it from serving as an effective check on the executive branch. Judicial decisions during the dictatorship reflected systemic institutional weakness rather than merely political pressure or ideological alignment. Because this constitutional framework continues to shape Chile’s courts even after the return to democracy, meaningful reform cannot rely on ordinary institutional adjustments; instead, reform must confront and transform the Constitution itself to dismantle the authoritarian legacy embedded in Chile’s legal system and create a genuinely independent judiciary.

Recommended Citation

Daniela González García, The Silent Bench: How the Chilean Judiciary Failed to Check Pinochet's Executive Power and the Continued Struggle for Judicial Independence, 1 Latin Am. & Carib. L. Rev. (2026), https://ecollections.law.fiu.edu/latinamericancaribbeanlawreview/vol1/iss1/14.